NON-CONSENSUAL SURETYSHIP by CAMPBELL, MORTON C.
NON-CONSENSUAL SURETYSHIP
MORTON C. CAMPBELLt
T HE mass of cases of consensual suretyship commanding the attention
of courts and lawyers tends to obscure the possibility and the value
of the non-consensual relation. Whenever two persons are under obliga-
tion or under property liability to a third, who is legally or equitably
entitled to but one performance, it is necessary to fix the relation between
the first two and thus determine the ultimate incidence of loss. Con-
sensual suretyship exists when there is an uyiderstanding between the
two persons, expressed or implied in fact, that one shall bear the loss in
the end. If there is no such mutual understanding, a relation must be
established in accordance with the requirements of equity and good con-
science, and special economic and social interests involved, if any, so
that the final imposition of loss will not be left to depend on accidental,
capricious, collusive or corrupt action on the part of the third person.
If the loss should be borne by one alone, the relation may be fittingly
described as non-consensual suretyship; if by both, as non-consensual
coprincipalship.
The value of the relation of non-consensual suretyship lies chiefly in
the surety's incidental rights of recourse. These rights comprise sub-
rogation and commensurate exoneration.' On account of possible injus-
tice to the principal, the relational right of reimbursement, which normally
accompanies consensual suretyship, is here excluded, except where the
principal has consented to the suretyship risk.
Cases of non-consensual suretyship naturally fall into four classes:
(1) when the surety alone consents to his incurring risk for the principal's
performance; (2) when only the principal consents to this suretyship
risk; (3) when both principal and surety consent; and (4) when neither
consents.
I
SURETY ALONE CONSENTING TO HiS UNDERTAXING SUiETsm RISK
The fact that the principal gives no consent does not prevent the rise
of the relation with incidental rights of subrogation and co-extensive
exoneration. Typical cases of such non-consensual suretyship are as
follows:
tProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Moreover, the surety, as a non-officious payor, has a quasi-contractual right against
the principal for the amount of the debt, this being the fair value of the benefit conferred
on the principal. Wright v. Garlinghouse, 27 Barb. 474, 478 (N. Y. 1853). Contra:
McPherson v. Meek, 30 Mo. 345, 348 (1860) (alternative decision); Ricketson v. Giles,
91 Ill. 154 (1878) (dictum); Teberg v. Swenson, 32 Kan. 224, 4 Pac. 83 (1884) (dictum).
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(1) The surety undertakes obligation by procurement of the creditor
(or other obligee), and without the consent or, it seems, even against the
will of the principal.' Thus, if one assigns a chose in action, guaranteeing
its payment without assent by the obligor, the relation between them is
non-consensual suretyship, and if the guarantor pays the assignee his
only relational right of recourse is subrogation, which is obviously value-
less if action on the chose is barred by the Statute of Limitations8
(2) The surety assumes obligation by procurement of one who is
neither creditor nor principal and without the consent of the principal;
for example, if, at the request of X and for a consideration given by him,
S promises X in writing that P, the principal, shall pay his debt to C,
the creditor, S, is bound to C, since the latter is a donee-beneficiary, and
the situation is one of non-consensual suretyship.
(3) A Surety, S2, undertakes obligation for the performance of the
obligation of another person, S1, who is surety for P to C, and he so
undertakes at the request of Si, C, or X, and without the consent of P.
The result is that S2 is surety for P as well as for Si. Since P and S2
are both under risk to C and C may require but one performance, some
relation must be legally established to prevent creditor's caprice and
collusion; and the relation between S2 and P, respectively, must be that
of surety and principal.4 Any other relation, such as that of principal
and surety, or coprincipalship, might result in improper indirect attack
on S1 (for example, if P should pay C, P would fall upon S2 and thus
throw S2 upon Si), and in circuity of action (for Si would next strike P).
Really, the situation is one of subsuretyship, P being principal, S1 surety
for P, and S2 surety for both.,
(4) The surety undertakes obligation at the request of one of two
coprincipals and without the consent of the other. Thus, if P1 and P2
2. Davis v. Schlemmer, 150 Ind. 472, 50 N. E. 373 (1898); Mathews v. Aikin, 1 N. Y.
595 (1848); and see Bishop v. Rowe, 71 Me. 263 (1880); Carter v. Jones, 5 Ired. Eq. 196
(N. C. 1848); L. R. A. 1918F 709.
3. Marsh v. Hayford, 80 Me. 97, 13 AtI. 271 (1888). In the case of indorsement of a
negotiable instrument, at least if it be payable to order, consent in advance is imported by
the character of the instrument. Godfrey v. Rice, 59 Me. 308, 313 (1871) ; cf. NmoTImBLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW § 121.
4. Leake v. Ferguson, 2 Gratt.419 (Va. 1846) ; Goddard v.Whyte, 2 Giff. 449 (Ch. 1860).
The possibility of collusion between C and P appears from the fact that P might Induce C
to sue S2 first, with the thought that S1 might become insolvent before S could recover
from him or that P himself might become execution-proof before judgment could be recov-
ered against him by S 1 .
5. Most situations of subsuretyship have been excluded from this article. Reference may




undertake a joint or joint and several obligation to C, and S at the re-
quest of P1 engages that they will perform, or more generally that the
obligation will be performed,' S is not only consensual surety for P1
but also non-consensual surety for P2,7 because this result accords with
the understanding of S as manifested by the form of his promise to C
and is in keeping with the expectation of P2,8 unless of course there is
an agreement between S and P2 to the contrary, or S rejects such a
relation. So also, even though S merely promises that P, will perform
the obligation, it seems that S will be surety for P2 as well as for P 1, for
the one performance for which they all become responsible is as much
the proper performance of P2 as it is of P1, especially when both have
received the equivalent therefor.'0
(5) A surety, S, undertakes obligation for and at the request of A,
6. Agren v. Staker, 46 Idaho 36, 267 Pac. 460 (1928); CA-.azrWs C% rS on SUnMvIP
(1931) 129; Taulv.Epperson, 38 Tex. 492, 496 (1873) (supersedeas bond given by P1 with
S as surety; it did not appear whether P, and P2 were co-principals or surety and principal,
respectively, but the reasoning of the court indicates that S would be surety for P. in either
case).
Professor Stephen I. Langmaid, in his able article, in (1934) 47 Harv. L. REv. 976, takes
the position that S is not a surety for P.. He reasons in effect that, if P1 and P2 are jointly
or jointly and severally bound to C in the sum of $1,000, as between them each is principal
for $500 of the obligation and surety for the remaining $500; and hence that it is only as
to the latter half that S is surety for P, and hence for P.. The writer is unable to agree
with either the conclusion or the reasoning. Are not the obligation and hence the r'sL- of
P, and P2 integral rather than divided? The situation is different from one in which
P, and P1 have each executed a note for $500 with the other as surety thereon. See Pace
v. Pace's Adm'r., 95 Va. 792, 30 S. E. 361, 44 L. R. A. 459 (1898). Furthermore, if the riLk
were divisible, what would be the relation of S and P. as to the half for which P. is
principally responsible? At least co-suretyship, it seems; and probably P2 should be accounted
an interposed surety in view of the fact that he participated in the fruits of the transaction
and S did not.
7. Hecker v. Mahler, 64 Ohio St. 398, 60 N. E. 555 (1901).
8. Cf. Keith v. Goodwin, 31 Vt. 268 (1858); Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. 160
(Ch. 1807); 2 W o.LiST oN CoNT-Acrs (1920) § 1282.
9. Thus, in Hill v. Wright, Williams & Co., 23 Ark. 530, 532 (1861), C had a claim
against P1 and P2, owners of a steamboat, and to prevent C from seizing the veasl P, gave
a bond with S, as surety, and P. one with S2 as surety. Judgment having been rendered
against P, and P2, the sureties each paid one half thereof; P2 reimbursed &, but P2 failed
to reimburse SI. It was held that S, was not entitled to compensation from P2 . The court
seemingly recognized that ordinarily S, would have been so entitled, but relied on the fact
that S, expressly refused to undertake responsibility for P2 , but required that P. obtain a
surety for himself. The results were that S, was surety only for P, and hence was limited to
subrogation to the latter's right for contributive exoneration against P2 (which right had
been satisfied by the payment made by P, to 2), and S1, had he paid all, would have had
no right of contribution against S.
10. Robinson v. Sherman, 2 Gratt. 178 (Va. 1845) (forthcoming bond given by P, with
S as surety; P, and P2 were co-principals). The only criticism which can be made of
Taul v. Epperson, 38 Tex. 492 (1873), and Robinson v. Sherman, supra, is that in both
there was variation of the risk of P, and hence S might well have been related to P2 as P, w-s.
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who with B is surety for P; S should be surety for both the co-sureties,
and not merely surety for one and co-surety with the other. The per-
formance for which S is responsible is due as much from B as from A .
Here again relations of subsuretyship are present, that is, between P,
A and S, and between P, B and S.
(6) All the situations thus far considered may be varied by making
the surety's risk relate to his property rather than consist in obligation.
Thus S might mortgage real or personal property to secure the debt of
P to C, at the instance of C or X, though without the consent of P, and
so become a real surety for P with relational rights of subrogation and
commensurate exoneration. Moreover, S might mortgage property to se-
cure the obligation of A, who along with B is surety for P, though with-
out the consent of B, and thus become the real surety for B as well as for
A and P.12 Furthermore, one can conceive of a situation in which C,
having received a note and a mortgage on Whiteacre from P, surrenders
the note but retains the mortgage title or lien1 and thereafter without
the consent of P takes a mortgage on Blackacre from S to secure the
same payment; S is real surety for P, a real principal, for, while neither
is under obligation, the property of each is exposed to the risk of non-
payment of the stated sum of money and as between the two, in equity
and good conscience, P's property should be sold to produce the money.
The results are that if C realizes on Whiteacre, P will have no recourse
against Blackacre, but that if C realizes on Blackacre S will be subrogated
to the mortgage on Whiteacre; furthermore, S would even be entitled to
exoneration, that is, to have Whiteacre sold first in ease of Blackacre,
at least if he adequately indemnifies C against loss resulting therefrom.1
11. Distinguish a case in which the risk of S arises from becoming bound on a stay bond
for one surety and so varying the risk of the other. Crow v. Murphy, 12 B. Mon. 444
(Ky. 1851).
12. A different situation was involved in Furnold v. Bank of Missouri, 44 Mo. 336 (1869).
C obtained a judgment against S1 and $2, which was a lien on land of each; hence each
was contributively subrogated to the lien on the land of the other; S1 conveyed his land to A,
receiving the full purchase price; S2 later conveyed his land to B; A paid the judgment to C.
It was held that A was contributively subrogated to the judgment lien of C on the land of B,
The case is sound; it is true that A was real surety for S1, but only because the land acquired
by him was already subject to the judgment lien; hence, while he succeeded to the rights
of S1, as the case decided, he could stand in no higher position than S1, because he tool.
his land subject to the lien of the judgment in which S2 (and later B) had a like equity of
contributive subrogation.
13. Whether or not the mortgage survives the surrender of the note depends on the
intention of mortgagee and mortgagor. If intended to survive, the mortgage will secure the
act of payment. Hemenway v. Bassett, 13 Gray 378 (Mass. 1859); Donnelly v. Simonton,
13 Minn. 301 (1868); PiNGREY ON MORTOAOES (1893) § 1228.
14. Cf. West Huntsville Cotton Mills Co. v. Alter, 164 Ala. 305, 51 So. 338 (1910);
Henry v. Compton, 2 Head 549 (Tenn. 1859); Neal v. Bufflngton, 42 W. Va. 327, 331, 26




WHEN ONLY THE PRINCIPAL CONSENTS TO THE SURETYsHIP RisK
Here again the relation of principal and surety arises although it is
non-consensual. Indeed, the surety's rights of recourse are more exten-
sive than in the situations last discussed. The following illustrations are
taken from the field of negotiable instruments:
(1) If the payee of a negotiable bill or note, by whom it has been
stolen or to whom it has been delivered for safekeeping or other restricted
purpose, wrongfully negotiates it by indorsement to a holder in due
course, the latter acquires an enforceable right against the drawer or
maker, as well as against the indorser. It is quite clear that as between
these persons the loss should ultimately fall on the wrongdoer; hence a
non-consensual relation of principal and surety is created between the
payee and the drawer (or maker), respectively 8 Again, if the payee
had transferred property as consideration for the instrument but induced
the transaction through fraudulent representation made to the drawer (or
maker), the latter, on taking steps appropriate to rescission as against the
indorsing payee, would become a surety for him to a holder in due
course. 6 If the fraudulent payee had retained the instrument, the re-
scinding drawer or maker would have had a defence; in view of the nego-
tiation to a holder in due course, the drawer or maker must be denied any
defence, but he will be given the next best protection possible, that is, the
position of surety in respect to the payee, although he originally contem-
plated sole or principal liability.17 So also, if there had been failure of
consideration or breach of warranty, instead of fraud, and effective
rescission therefor, the drawer or maker would become a surety instead of
a sole or principal obligor, as he originally intended.' 8
(2) In like manner, if one acquires possession of a valid negotiable
note from the owner by theft or for safekeeping or other limited purpose
and wrongfully negotiates it with or without indorsement to a holder in
due course'9 as security for his own debt, the wrongdoer and the owner
15. McBride v. Potter-Lovell Co., 169 Mass. 7, 47 N. E. 242 (1897) (holding that M,1
and M 2 were co-sureties for P) ; Cummins v. Line, 43 Okla. 575, 143 Pac. 672 (1914) (same).
16. Vian v. Hilberg, 111 Neb. 232, 248, 196 N. W. 153, 160 (1923) (holding Ml, and Z"2
co-sureties for P).
17. Compare the analogous situation in which a principal gives judicial bond with surety,
thereby causing variation of risk of the original surety; while the original surety is not
discharged, the variation of his risk requires that he stand in the relation of surety for the
surety on the judicial bond. See the writer's article, supra Note 5, at 445.
18. Baker v. Brem, 103 N. C. 72, 80, 9 S. E. 629, 631 (1889) (breach of warranty, and
chattel tendered by .maker and received by payee in consequence thereof).
19. The words "negotiation" and "holder in due course" presuppose that the latter falls
within the tenor of the instrument (NzcorTmLa I=uzm-sTarrs Lvw §§ 30, 191, 52), as he
does if the instrument is payable to bearer or indorsed to bearer or in blank by the payee
or a special indorsee.
19351
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stand in the non-consensual relation of principal and real surety, respec-
tively, a relation arising with the consent of the principal but without
that of the surety.20 A similar situation would be present if the transferor
had obtained a valid instrument from the owner for a consideration but
through fraudulent representation, or if there had been failure of con-
sideration or breach of warranty, followed by effective rescission therefor.
In the cases considered under this topic, either the injured person can
maintain an action of tort against the wrongdoer 21 or, in case of failure
of consideration or breach of warranty, an action of contract; and in
many instances an action of quasi contract would be a concurrent remedy.
But these would not be the only remedies one would have and sometimes
not the best. Being a real or personal surety, as the case may be, he
20. Consequently, if the wrongdoer transfers negotiable notes or other negotiable secur-
ities, owned by two or more persons, to secure the same debt, such persons become, non-
consensually, real sureties for the wrongdoer and hence co-sureties, with appropriate relative
rights of contributory reimbursement, subrogation and exoneration. Duncan v. Johnston
& Co., 3 F. (2d) 422, 424 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), cert. denied, 267 U. S. 600 (1925) ; Sexton
v. American Trust Co., 45 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); In re J. C. Wilson & Co., 252
Fed. 631 (S. D.* N. Y. 1917) ; Gould v. Central Trust Co., 6 Abb. N. C. 381 (N. Y. 1879) ;
Asylum of St. Vincent v. McGuire, 239 N. Y. 375, 146 N. E. 632 (1925). Contra: Leonard
v. Hunt, 36 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929), reversing 29 id. 593 (D. Mass. 1928).
Authorities are collected in Notes (1919) 1 A. L. R. 664; (1923) 24 id. 479; (1925) 38 Id.
1219; (1927) 48 id. 803; (1932) 76 id. 794. See CMuBE'uS CAsEs oN SuRmsurx, 172-177,
176, n. 2.
21. Authorities are collected in (1895) 27 L. R. A. 519; (1914) 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945;
BRANNmx's NEGOTmBE INsTmRuNiNs LAW (5th ed., Beutel, 1932) 372, 373, 540, 541.
According to many authorities, the drawer (or maker) may recover full damages from the
payee although the former has paid nothing to the holder in due course notwithstanding
that the payee is still obligated to the holder. Decker v. Matthews, 12 N. Y. 313 (1885)
(judgment previously recovered by holder against maker) ; Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co. v.
Kneeland, 120 N. Y. 134, 24 N. E. 381.(1890) (action not yet begun by holder against maker) ;
Hoffman v. Toft, 70 Ore. 488, 142 Pac. 365 (1914) (same); Notes (1895) 27 L. R. A. 519;
(1914) 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945. But see Freeman v. Venner, 120 Mass. 424 (1876). The
writer disagrees with the first mentioned authorities because, theoretically, it is non-relief
from sole liability which constitutes damage, and, practically, the defendant is left exposed
to recovery by the holder and to the risk of the plaintiff's intervening insolvency. Had the
existence of the suretyship relation and the advantages of a bill in equity for exoneration been
perceived, judgment for substantial damages would probably have been refused or at least
qualified. That exoneration may be had is shown by Perry v. Engel, 296 Ill. 549, 557,
130 N. E. 340, 344 (1921): the maker having rescinded the transaction as against the payee
for breach of fiduciary duty, in a suit in equity brought by the former against the latter
it was decreed that the payee either pay the complainant or pay the note to the holder at
maturity. In Baker v. Brem, 103 N. C. 72, 80, 9 S. E. 629, 632 (1889), it was recognized
that a judgment rendered in favor of the maker against the payee should provide that
execution should not be issued until the latter should be relieved from his liability as indorser,
presumably by the plaintiff's paying the holder, the court saying that equity would have
granted an injunction to that effect under the former procedure; the objection to such a
judgment is that the plaintiff would have to suffer loss before having effective redress against
the defendant; it would be much more to his interest to obtain exoneration, as in the
Illinois case.
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would certainly have relational rights of subrogation, including an imme-
diate equitable interest in any security received by the obligee from the
principal; also, it is submitted, a relational right of reimbursement,
because, in view of the principal's consent to the surety's risk, it is as
just to require reimbursement here as in cases of consensual suretyship;
and, lastly, a right of exoneration commensurate with the other two
relational rights, or either of them.
I
WHEN BOTH PRINcrPAL AND SURETY CONSENT TO THE SURETYSm RISK
It is conceivable that the obligee, at the instance of the principal or
merely with his consent, might procure from the surety a binding promise
that the principal would pay his debt to the obligee; in such a case the
relation is non-consensual because, without more appearing, there is no
pertinent understanding, expressed or implied in fact, between principal
and surety.22
In cases falling within this topic the surety would seem to have a
relational right of reimbursement, as well as of subrogation, with a
commensurate right of exoneration; for here again the principal con-
sented to the rise of the suretyship risk, and hence it would seem to be
proper to subject him to the three kinds of recourse, just as in the case
of consensual suretyship.
IV
NEITHER SURETY NOR PRINCIPAL CONSENTING TO THE SURETYSHIP Risx
This topic includes the most difficult cases of non-consensual surety-
ship and merits extended treatment. It will be observed that in situations
considered under several of the following subtopics, while the surety
willingly undertook risk and a principal liability later developed, still the
surety might have become responsible without any liability attaching to
another person, and hence it cannot be said that the surety willingly
undertook suretyship risk; instances will be found in the relation of
surety and principal created between an insurer and a tortfeasor who
is in fault, or not in fault, in the like relation between an insurer of a
shipper and the carrier of goods (or the latter's indemnitor), and in the
relation sometimes arising between the indemnitor of a tortfeasor and a
co-tortfeasor. Moreover, in cases treated under certain other subtopics,
neither surety nor principal contracted for risk, let alone suretyship risk;
22. One might also imagine a situation in which a stranger, with the connent of the
principal, had procured a binding promise from the surety that the principal would pay hiss
debt to the obligee; in such a case the surety would be bound to the creditor, the latter




for instance, when two persons incurred tort liability, one because of
fault and the other without fault, or when two tortfeasors were in fault
but one of them in equity and good conscience or for other reasons should
bear the ultimate burden of reparation.
A. Relation between Insurer and Tortfeasor Who is in Fault
An insurer and a tortfeasor whose wilful, reckles§ or negligent conduct
causes loss to a third person, for which loss the insurer is bound to in-
demnify 3 the latter, are in the relation of surety and principal,"4 although
it is obviously not consensual. 25  The reasons are (1) that the insurer
and the tortfeasor are bound, the one by contract and the other because
of his tort, to indemnify the insured for the loss; (2) that, in equity and
good conscience, the insured should but once receive full compensation
in his own behalf; and (3) as between the insured and a tortfeasor who
is in fault, the latter should bear the ultimate burden of making com-
pensation for the loss resulting therefrom. The consequences of this
relation of surety and principal are, first, that the insurer is subrogated
in equity to the rights of the insured against the tortfeasor, even in the
absence of the usual provision in the policy to that effect,20 or if, having
paid the insured, he prefers to proceed at law he may maintain a quasi-
contractual action against the tortfeasor;27 secondly, a release executed
by insured to tortfeasor before payment made by the insurer discharges
the insurer;2 S and, thirdly, settlement made by the tortfeasor or his
indermnitor with the insured in the knowledge that the latter has already
received compensation for the loss from the insurer does not discharge
the effective equitable right of subrogation of the insurer against the
23. Hence this doctrine is applicable to fire and marine insurance, and not to life and
accident insurance. In the latter kinds of insurance the insured may, in his own behalf,
enforce payment of the policy and also obtain reparation from the tortfeasor; hence one
of the essentials of suretyship is absent. RICHARDS ON INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) § 52;
VANcE ON IxsuRAN E (2d ed. 1930) §§ 175-177, p. 679.
24. Chicago & Alton Rr. Co. v. Glenny, 175 1i. 238, 51 N. E. 896 (1898); JoYCE ou
INsURANCE (2d ed. 1918) § 3574; MAY ON INsuRAN CE (4th ed. 1900) § 454.
25. Even the insurer merely contemplates that loss may result from the fault of another.
26. JoYcE oN INSURANcE § 3574; RICHARDS ON INSURANCE § 52; VANcE ON INSURANCE
§§ 175-177, p. 676. Accordingly, an indemnitor against liability is subrogated, with or
without agreement, to the rights of the indemnitee against a tortfeasor, who imposed liability
on the indemnitee by negligently injuring his servant. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes
Engineering Works Co., 184 Fed. 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911).
27. It is to be observed that the tortfeasor is not under tort liability to the insurer, the
latter's damage being regarded as too remote; if he were, a tortfeasor would be responsible
to an insurer of life or against accident; but the cases hold the contrary. Connecticut Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rr. Co., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); JoYCI ON
INsuRANcE § 3579; RICARDs ON INSURANCE § 52; VANCE ON INsURANCr §§ 175-177, p. 679.
28. J oCE ON I-SURANCE § 3541; RICHARDS ON INsURANCE § 57; VANcE ON INSURANCE
§§ 175-177, p. 675; Note (1911) 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 698; and see Note (1928) 55 A, L. R. 926,
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tortfeasor or his indemnitor, even though the settlement was accompanied
by a release.'
B. Relation between Insurer and Tortfeasor under Absolute Liability
The insurer is generally subrogated to the cause of action of the insured
against one who is under tort liability for loss of or damage to the in-
sured property even though the tortfeasor is without fault. Instances of
such absolute liability are: (1) statutory liability imposed on a railroad
company for causing fire through the operation of its locomotives or
otherwise; (2) the common law liability of a carrier for loss of or damage
to goods; (3) the liability of a principal for the tort of his agent, and
especially of a master for that of his servant, resting on the doctrine of
respondeat superior; and (4) liability under the principle of Rylands v.
Fletcher °
The fundamental proposition in all these cases is that the insurer is
surety and the person under absolute tort liability is principal, with the
same legal consequences as those set forth under the last subtopic. The
reasons for the establishment of this relation, rather than the reverse
relation or coprincipaship, are sufficient, although not so compelling as
in the case of liability for fault. They will be developed in connection
with the treatment of the first and second classes of absolute liability,
that is, the statutory liability of a railroad company for causing fires
and the liability of carrier to shipper.
1. Relation between Insurer and Railroad Company Causing Fire
without Fault.
For the railroad company it may be argued that it should be surety
for the insurer on the ground that the latter has deliberately and speci-
fically undertaken the risk of loss by fire without regard to its origin,
whereas the absolute liability of the railroad company arises merely as
a statutory consequence of the operation of the railroad; also, that the
insurer is engaged in the business of underwriting such risks, the pre-
miums for which might be raised sufficiently to compensate for a denial
of subrogation. On the other hand, the insurer may argue more cogently:
(1) that the railroad company is carrying on a dangerous business from
which loss actually ensues in the particular case, and in which the rates
for service may be so adjusted as to counterbalance denial of recourse
29. JoYcE ON INsUaAcE § 3544; 1RxcnMMs on L su-c= § 57; VAcE oN. Lsmu%,cz
§§ 175-177, p. 676; Note (1911) 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 698. For conceivable remedies, sound-
ing in tort or quasi contract, which the indemnifying insurer has against the insured, who
executes a release of his cause of action to the tortfeasor or his indemnitor, see Notes (192S)
36 A. L. R. 1267; (1934) 47 HAy. L. Rnv. 830 [commenting on American Automobile Fire
Ins. Co. v. Spieker, 97 Ind. App. 533, 187 N. E. 355 (1933)].
30. L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
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against the insurer; (2) that to advance insurance premiums on adjacent
property would be unjust to a part of the community not seeking the
services of the carrier, whereas to raise the rates of carriage is merely
to place the ultimate cost thereof on users of the utility which causes
the loss; (3) the railroad company is in control of the instrumentality;
(4) the loss commonly results from faulty construction, maintenance or
operation, faults difficult to prove. Accordingly, the insurer is generally
placed in the position of surety for the railroad company, regardless
of the latter's fault, and is given subrogation.1
In a few states, however, e.g., in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hamp-
shire and Colorado, an amendment to the statute has reversed the
relation, 2 by providing in effect that the railroad company shall have
an insurable interest in exposed property and be entitled to the benefit
of any insurance thereon, and if the insured shall have received payment
of the insurance that the amount thereof shall be deducted from the
damages recoverable for the tort, or if not so paid that the policy upon
settlement of the damage shall be assigned to the railroad company.
The amendment is generally held to apply to negligent as well as non-
negligent fires occurring after the enactment of the amendment; and
to be constitutional, although the policy contains an agreement for sub-
rogation to, and assignment of any claim for damagesa 3  It has been
properly decided, 4 however, that the amendment does not change the
31. Crissey Lumber Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande Rr. Co., 17 Colo. App. 275, 299, 68 Pac.
670, 677 (1902); Hart v. Western Rr. Corp., 13 Mete. 99 (Mass. 1847).
32. 'New England Box Co. v. New York Central & Hudson River Rr. Co., 210 Mass.
465, 468, 97 N. E. 140, 141 (1912).
33. Leavitt v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 90 Me. 153, 37 Atl. 886 (1897) (policy issued before
the amendment and non-negligent fire occurring afterwards; insured allowed to recover from
the railroad company only the difference between loss and insurance); Lyons v. Boston &
Lowell Rr. Co., 181 Mass. 551, 64 N. E. 404 (1902) (same); New England Box Co. v.
N. Y. C. & H. Rr. Co., 210 Mass. 465, 97 N. E. 140 (1912) (policy issued and negligent
fire occurring after the amendment; insurance companies denied subrogation); Boston Ice
Co. v. B. & M. Rr. Co., 77 N. H. 6, 86 At. 356 (1913) (same); Faxren v. Maine Cent. Rr.
Co., 112 Me. 81, 90 Atl. 497 (1914) (same) (overruling Dyer v. Maine Cent. Rr. Co., 99
Me. 195, 58 Atl. 994 (1904)1. But in British America Assur. Co. v. Colo. & So. Rr. Co., 52
Colo. 589, 125 Pa. 508, 1135, (1912), where the policy was issued before, and the fire occurred
after, the enactment of an amendment which denied subrogation to the insurer, but saved rights
accruing before its enactment, it was held that the case fell within the saving clause (aside from
any question of unconstitutionality for impairing the obligation of contracts), and that the in-
surer was entitled to subrogation. The writer disagrees with this interpretation of the amend-
ment. In its absence, the insurer would have no right of subrogation until the loss occurred;
for subrogation is essentially a right of recourse against a principal and one is not a principal
until he comes under liability; furthermore, an agreement for subrogation, or for assignment
on payment, between insured and insurer, gives the latter no effective right against the
railroad company, because the very act of payment works an equitable extinguishment of
the claim of the insured against the railroad company. Authorities are collected in 41 L. R, A.
(N. S.) 1202 (constitutionality discussed); 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203.
34. Wild v. Boston & Maine Rr. Co., 171 Mass. 245, 50 N. E. 533 (1898).
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relation between insurer and railroad company in respect to liability for
a fire occurring before its enactment.
2. Relation between Insurer of Shipper and Carrier of Goods
a. In General
Another instance of absolute liability is that of the common carrier
of goods. Here also, in the absence of controlling stipulation, as soon
as the loss of or damage to the goods occurs, the insurer and the carrier
come into the relation of surety and principal, respectively, so that the
insurer is subrogated to the rights of the shipper against the carrier 3
The reasons are similar to those governing the relation between insurer
and railroad company under statutory absolute liability for setting or
causing fires, that is, the onus of compensation should ultimately rest
on all shippers through increased rates rather than on insured shippers
through increased premiums. Moreover, the carrier is in control of the
goods, the loss is usually the result of negligence or other fault on the
part of him or of his agent or servant, and such fault is difficult of proof.
Furthermore, it is all the clearer that the insurer becomes surety for
the carrier if the loss or damage results from the fault of the carrier or
his agent or servant.36
There is added reason for such subrogation if the insurance contract
stipulates therefor.3" It is not that the stipulation operates as an assign-
35. JoYca oN INspuaa=c § 3549; R.cELaws ON b2suA Ecn § 52; VaLca o,- LsMrA!.C
§§ 175-177, p. 677.
36. Relation between Insurer of Shipper and Indeinnitor of Carrier. If the facts are
such that the insurer is surety for the carrier and hence subrogated to rights of the shipper
against the carrier, the insurer is also subrogated to such rights as the chipper has against
an indemnitor of the carrier, e.g., rights resting on statute or the form of the undertaking
of indemnity. Sorenson v. Boston Ins. Co., 20 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) (liability
insurance taken out by tortfeasor).
37. Stipulation for Subrogation in Policy of Insurance and Release of Prospecive Liability
of a Tortfeasor or Carrier. If the contract of insurance contains a stipulation for subrogation
to any cause of action in tort which the insured may have and the insured has already
effectively released or later so releases another per-on from all prospective liability, it is
properly held that the insurer is discharged from responsibility for the tort of that person,
since the action of the insured makes or has made subrogation impossible. Downs Ware-
house Association v. Pioneer Ins. Ass'n., 41 Wash. 372, 83 Pac. 423 (1905) (fire insurance
with stipulation for subrogation; later spur track agreement, in which insured rdeased
railroad company from all liability for fire); Fire Association v. La Grange Compress Co.,
50 Tex. Civ. App. 172, 109 S. W. 1134 (1908) (dictum that insurer is discharged where Ie ne
has by lease released railroad company from all liability and insurance is later issued with
stipulation for subrogation; decision that insurer was bound because of waiver through
agent's knowledge of release). But see Pelzer Manufacturing Co. v. Sun Fire Office, 36 S. C.
213, 267, 263, 15 S. E. 562, 582 (1891) (like facts; question of intentional concealment of
material fact left to jury, which answered it in negative; judgment affirmed). Discharge is
obvious if the policy is expressly avoided because of the release. Kennedy Brothers v. Iova
Ins. Co., 119 Iowa 29, 91 N. W. 831 (1902); Bloomingdale v. Columbia Ins. Co., 84 N. Y.
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ment of an enforceable claim of the shipper against the carrier, because,
once the shipper accepts satisfaction of the loss from either person liable,
in equity and good conscience he is not entitled in his own behalf to
further compensation from the other, and therefore has nothing which
he can assign; the reason is rather that the stipulation in effect manifests
an understanding between insurer and insured that the former shall be
surety and the carrier principal, and the creation of that relation fulfills
the will of the insurer without violating any manifested intention of the
carrier.8
In an effort to reverse that result, carriers adopted the practice of
stipulating in the bill of lading for the benefit of any insurance effected
by the shipper. The first situation to be considered is where the insurer
has not stipulated for subrogation. He is not discharged, unless there
be fraudulent misrepresentation; without more, there seems to be no
fraudulent concealment of material fact by the shipper8m Nor is the
insurer placed in the position of a surety, but rather in that of a non-
consensual principal, in respect to the carrier, so that instead of the
insurer being subrogated to the tort claim against the carrier, the latter
is subrogated to the insurance even though the loss resulted from his
negligence or other fault.4" This is a just result, notwithstanding fault
on the part of the carrier, since it accords with the will. of the carrier
as expressed to the shipper without running counter to any manifested
understanding between insurer and shipper. Nor is there any principle
of insurance law which defeats the carrier's stipulation for the benefit of
the insurance; he has an insurable interest in the goods and hence may
insure himself against liability, even for his own negligence in respect
thereto, either directly or through a provision that he be entitled to the
insurance of another. 41
Supp. 572 (Sup. Ct. 1903) (release of common law liability contained in bill of lading). If,
however, liability for fault is excepted from the operation of the release, the insurer would
seem not to be discharged, inasmuch as the insured may still have a claim of substantial con-
tent to which the insurer may be subrogated. Cf. Brett, M.R., in Tate v. Hyslop, 15 Q. B.
D. 368, 375 (1885). And see the form of bill of lading prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which limits the carrier's liability to negligence in certain respects. 64 I. C. C.
347, 356, 357, 364A (1921).
38. Cf. Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. 160 (Ch. 1807); CAMParL's CAsEs ox SidRnrY-
sa 189 (subsuretyship).
39. Jackson Co. v. Boyiston Ins. Co., 139 Mass. 508, 2 N. E. 103 (1885) (bill of lading
given before insurance effected).
40. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312 (1886) (shipment and
insurance substantially simultaneous; carrier negligent); Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Calabs, 20
N. Y. 173 (1859) (bill of lading given before insurance effected); Platt v. Richmond Rr. Co.,
108 N. Y. 358, 15 N. E. 393 (1888); Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1116.
41. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 325 (1886); Wager v.
Providence Ins. Co., 150 U. S. 99 (1893); and see Luckenbach v. McCaban Sugar Co., 248
U. S. 139, 146 (1918); Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1116, 1118.
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b. Contradictory Stipulations in Contracts of Insurance and
Carriage
Where the insurer in his policy or contract has merely stipulated for
subrogation to any tort claim of the insured, that is, without requiring
a warranty or clause of avoidance, and the carrier in the bill of lading
or other shipping document has stipulated for the benefit of any insur-
ance, difficult questions are presented.
(1) Is the carrier discharged from liability for loss of or damage to
the goods because of the inconsistent stipulation in the contract of
insurance? In the first place, the usual provision, which is to the effect
that any carrier who is liable shall have the benefit of any insurance,
imports not excuse from liability but continuation of liability.9 More-
over, the usual provision merely entitles the carrier to "any insurance";
it does not call for any particular form of policy and hence not for one
which is free of opposing stipulations of subrogation, warranty or avoid-
ance. Lastly, at least as far as liability for negligence or other fault goes,
a provision would be void under the law of carriers which would purport
to exempt the carrier from such liability, or from such liability provided
that the shipper could insure against it,43 or which, for the protection of
the carrier against such liability, requires that the shipper have or get
insurance," or that it be of any particular form, as, for example, free
from such opposing stipulations, or that he pay over the proceeds thereof
to his prejudice.45 Consequently, such a provision does not give to the
carrier relief from such liability to the shipper or a counter right of
action against him."' All that the carrier may properly insist on is a
provision in the contract of carriage which gives to him merely the benefit
of whatever insurance the shipper may have or may obtain; such a
stipulation is not without legal effect.
(2) Is the insurer discharged in such a situation and, if not, what is
the relation between him and the carrier? If the insurance is issued
after or simultaneously with the shipping document and the insurer knows
of the provision therein, he should be firmly bound to the insured, for
he is not misled, and he should be ranked as principal in respect of the
carrier, since otherwise he would be knowingly defeating the latter's
expectations; and, even if he does not know of the provision, the insurer
42. Inman v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 129 U. S. 128 (1889).
43. The Hadji, 20 Fed. 875 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884).
44. Inman v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 129 U. S. 128, 139 (1889) (dictum); Bradley v.
Lehigh Valley Rr. Co., 153 Fed. 350, 354 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907) (dictum); The Hadji, 20 Fed.
875, 877 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884) (dictum).
45. The Turret Crown, 264 U. S. 591 (1924); Bradley v. Lehigh Valley Rr. Co, 153
Fed. 350, 354 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907) (dictum).
46. Inman v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 129 U. S. 128, 140 (1889); Southard v. Minneapolis
Ry. Co., 60 lnn. 382, 392, 62 N. W. 442, 619 (1895).
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should not be discharged because, as is later shown, there is no conceal-
ment of material fact; on the contrary he should be held, but ranked
as surety for the carrier for reasons about to be stated. When, however,
as usually happens, the insurance arises before carriage, for example,
upon an open or floating policy, it has been held that the insurer is
discharged, the reason given being that the agreed right of subrogation
has become impossible of fulfillment through action of the insured.4 7
The writer questions the soundness of reason and result. In his opinion,
the insurer may be held and still have subrogation as agreed. Since
the two stipulations for subrogation are contradictory, neither should be
recognized as a controlling manifestation of will, and the relation should
be determined as if both had been omitted from the documents. In that
case, as appears from the preceding subtopic, insurer and carrier would
be placed in the relation of surety and principal, respectively. Thus
the insurer may and should be firmly bound, but entitled to subrogation,
exactly as the policy provides. Moreover, the provision in the bill of
lading is thus seen to be an immaterial fact, so that concealment of its
presence, or even fraudulent representation of its absence, would not
relieve the insurer.
This reasoning is largely inapplicable wherever the contract of insur-
ance contains a warranty against, or a stipulation for avoidance or dis-
charge on, the insertion of a provision for the benefit of insurance in the
bill of lading. In either case the insurer may at his election avoid his
obligation under the policy." It is to be observed that the warranty,
or the stipulation for avoidance or discharge, goes to the mere presence
of the provision in the bill of lading, and is not dependent on its being
legally effective. Thus, the situation is reduced to one in which the
carrier is under undefeated tort liability to the shipper, and the insurer
47. Carstairs v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 18 Fed. 473 (C. C. D. Md. 1883) (judgment for
insurer in action brought by insured); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. International Ins. Co.,
84 Tex. 149, 19 S. W. 459 (1892) (paying insurer held discharged and denied subrogation);
Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1116.
48. Fayerweather v. Phenix Insurance Co., 118 N. Y. 324, 23 N. E. 192 (1890) (avoidance);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Easton, 73 Tex. 167, 11 S. W. 180, 3 L. R. A. 424 (1889)
(warranty); Southard v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., 60 Minn. 382, 391, 62 N. W. 444, 444 (1895)
(dictum). But, if the carrier is not liable to the shipper for the particular loss, e.g., because
of a provision in the bill of lading exempting it from absolute liability, a stipulation for
discharge is interpreted as not discharging the inst.rer as to such loss, and the carrier who
advances funds to the shipper on the security of the assignment of the insurance may recover
from the insurer. Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Manheim Ins. Co., 56 Fed. 301 (S. D. N. Y. 1893).
Of course, the policy may be so strictly worded that the insurer is discharged by force of
its very terms. Maxwell Textile Co., Inc. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., 225 App.
Div. 279, 232 N. Y. Supp. 586 (1st Dep't, 1929) (policy provided for discharge in case of
agreement between insured and carrier whereby any right of recovery was impaired which
would have accrued to the insurer but for such agreement; insured undervalued goods and
thus, under the bill of lading, limited right of recovery against carrier).
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is under no substantial obligation to the shipper at the time of the com-
mission of the tort. Two consequences ensue: First, if the carrier
compensates the shipper, he has no effective right of subrogation, because
the shipper has not an enforceable right against the insurer to which he
can be subrogated. 9 Secondly, the insurer has never become surety for
the carrier and cannot be entitled to subrogation as such. To keep the
good will of this and other shippers, however, the insurer frequently
prefers to put the insured in funds and himself take over the prosecution
of the cause of action in tort against the carrier. Will a simple payment
in satisfaction of the loss suffice? The general rule is that an insurer
may disregard discharge or power of avoidance, arising from breach of
warranty or condition, without being held officious, and by compensating
the insured for the loss obtain subrogation in equity to the right of the
latter against a carrier or other tortfeasor,50 or, it seems, quasi-contractual
recovery at law. Nor should the provision giving to the carrier the
benefit of insurance take the case out of the general rule." That pro-
vision does not entitle the carrier to the money, previously paid by
insurer to shipper, as being proceeds of the insurance; for that payment
did not proximately result from the contract of insurance but from the
desire of the insurer to preserve good will. The situation is analogous
to that in which a surety, discharged by the Statute of Limitations, by
-the Statute of Frauds,vor in bankruptcy, pays the creditor in disregard
of the defence; he is denied recovery on the relational rights of sub-
rogation and reimbursement because the payment is not the proximate
consequence of his suretyship undertaking, but is nevertheless given
subrogation in equity, or quasi-contractual recovery at law, against the
principal, simply because of his non-officious payment of the debt of
another.
Nevertheless, insurers have hesitated to make simple payment, but
have resorted to other devices which have been generally held to be
effective: The insurer may lend the amount of the loss to the insured
on the understanding that the proceeds of his cause of action against
the carrier should be applied in repayment, with or without an assignment
thereof as security, and with or without giving to the insurer control of
49. Insurance Co. of North America v. Easton, 73 Tex. 167, 11 S. W. ISO (18S9). No!e
(1925) 39 A. L. R. 1116.
50. The Insurance Co. v. The "C. D., Jr.," 1 Wood 72 (C. C. D. La., 1870); St. Louis
Ry. Co. v. Fire Association, 60 Ark. 325, 331, 30 S. W. 350, 352 (1895) (alternative decii"on) ;
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rowland Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 269, 119 S. E. 362 (1923)
(alternative decision); MAY ON NSUANCE § 454; Va-cEoN Izsupwzca §§ 175-177, p. 673.
Contra: Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. International Ins. Co., 84 Tex. 149, 19 S. W. 459 (1892) ;
and see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 549 (1883) (dictum); Gadzden
v. Brown, Speers Eq. 37, 41 (S. C. 1843) (dictum).




the prosecution of the action.2 Another method is to advance the
amount of the loss to the shipper as a loan, or in the guise of a loan,
without interest, but with a provision that it shall be repayable only to
the extent of recovery in the action against the carrier, with or without
an assignment of the cause of action as security, and with or without a
provision for prosecution of the action. Under either arrangement, the
insurer may justly claim from the shipper the amount of the proceeds
of the action against the carrier, and the carrier will not be entitled to
the money previously received by the shipper from the insurer, because
it was only a loan. Thus, the final results are much the same as if the
shipper had recovered from the carrier in the first instance.
Moreover, the position of a negligent carrier is not helped by the
presence in the bill of lading of a further provision that he shall be en-
titled to any payments made by the insurer "whether under the guise of
advances, loans or otherwise"; for to give effect thereto would be to
give the carrier relief from the consequences of negligent action at the
expense of the insured. 4
In the state of the authorities above referred to, the carrier has obvi-
ously nothing to gain, and the insured much to lose, by inserting in the
shipping contract a stipulation that the carrier shall have the benefit of
insurance when such stipulation would defeat the contract of insurance.
Hence a qualification of the stipulation has now become usual, that is,
"so far as this [stipulation] shall not avoid the policies or contracts of
insurance. ' ' s5 It seems that the insurer is not discharged from liability
for the loss of or damage to goods shipped under such a bill of lading.
52. Southard v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., 60 Minn. 382, 62 N. W. 442 (1895); Kalle & Co.,
Inc. v. Morton, 156 App. Div. 522, 523, 141 N. Y. Supp. 374, 375 (1st Dep't, 1913), 216
N. Y. 655, 110 N. E. 1043 (1915).
53. Luckenbach v. McCaban Sugar Co., 248 U. S. 139, 1 A. L. R. 1522 (1918); Bradley
v. Lehigh Valley Rr. Co., 153 Fed. 350, 352 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907). In the Supreme Court
case Brandeis, J., approved this device, saying that it was "consonant both with the needs
of commerce and the demands of justice." Moreover, the arrangement, if regarded as one
of disguised payment, imports an agreement for subrogation and has been supported as an
instance of conventional subrogation. Southard v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., 60 Minn. 382, 392,
62 N. W. 442, 444 (1895). Authorities are collected in, Note (1919) 1 A. L. R. 1528.
The device has been employed at times when simple payment would certainly have done as
well, e.g., in Sorenson v. Boston Ins. Co., 20 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Dejean v.
Louisiana Western Rr. Co., 167 La. 111, 118 So. 822 (1928) (insurer not discharged from
liability to the insured).
54. The Turret Crown, 297 Fed. 766, 777 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), 264 U. S. 591 (1924);
Note (1924) 38 HARe. L. Rxv. 117.
55. Indeed, the forms of bills of lading prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commisrion,
for export and for interstate transportation, contain the following provision: "Any carrier
or party liable on account of loss of or damage to any of said property shall have the full
benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or on account of said property,
so far as this shall not avoid the policies or contracts of insurance: Provided, That the carrier
reimburse the claimant for the premium paid thereon." 64 1. C. C. 347, 356, 357, 364A (1921).
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The apparent circularity of expression may be resolved by interpreting
the provision in the bill of lading as entitling the carrier to the insurance
if there is no opposing stipulation in the policy or contract of insurance,
that is, no warranty or provision for avoidance; and not, if there is.P
Consequently, the insured may recover from the insurer; 7 the insurer
is effectively subrogated to his cause of action against the carrier; s and
the carrier is not entitled to the insurance."
C. Relation between Two Tortfeasors, One because of Fault and the
Other without Fault
As between two persons under tort liability to a third, one having
been in fault and the other not, the former should bear the ultimate
burden of compensation; hence, he is principal and the other surety. The
following are typical illustrations of this principle:
(1) A master or other employer, who is responsible for the torts of a
servant or other agent by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior
and who compensates the injured person, may in turn have compensa-
tion from the latter."' In most instances this result may be sustained
on the ground of a right of reimbursement arising from an actual
promise thereof, expressed or implied in fact. The result may also be
rested on rights created by law as incidents of the relation of surety and
principal. First, a right of subrogation to the cause of action of the in-
jured person against the tortfeasor; 61 and, secondly, perhaps, a right of
reimbursement. As to the latter right, it must be admitted that the
56. Adams v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 1027, 188 N. W. 823, 24 A. L. R. 182
(1922). Contra: Kalle & Co., Inc. v. Morton, 156 App. Div. 522, 523, 141 N. Y. Supp. 374,
375 (1913) [dictum, without discussion; decision alone affirmed in 216 N. Y. 655, 110 N. E.
1043 (1915)].
57. Adams v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 1027, 188 N. W. 823 (1922) ; Note (1923)
24 A. L. R. 189.
58. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N. W. 4 (1925); Dejean v.
Louisiana Western Rr. Co., 167 La. 111, 118 So. 822 (1928); Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1116.
59. Graysonia Rr. Co. v. Newberger Cotton Co., 170 Ark. 1039, 1054, 282 S. W. 975,
981 (1926).
60. Ohio Valley Bank v. Greenebaum Trust Co., 11 F. (2d) 87, 91 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926)
(deceit by officer of bank; reasoning); Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420, 427, 97 Pac. 875,
878 (1908); Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Lathnam, 63 Me. 177 (1874) (abuse of p3cenger by
conductor); Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. 1, 3, 98 N. E. 781, 782 (1912) (libel committed
by directors of employer corporation); Fedden v. Brooklyn Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741,
744, 199 N. Y. Supp. 9, 12 (1923) (servant impleaded by master under Crvn PAcnicz Acr,
§ 193); Gaffner v. Johnson, 39 Wash. 437 (1905). Also, see authorities cited in Note (1912)
40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153, and in the able article of Professor Robert A. Leflar in (1932)
81 U. or PA. L. REv. 130.
61. When compensation is given by employer to employee under workmen's compensation
statutes, subrogation of the employer to the rights of the employee against the per-on in
fault is now usually provided for, expressly or impliedly, by such statutes. Notes (1922)
19 A. L. R. 766, 782; (1923) 27 id. 493, 500; (1925) 37 id. 838, 844, 833; (1930) 67 id. 249, 266.
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employer did not consent to the employee's tort or to the incurring of
liability therefor, and hence the relation of surety and principal is neces-
sarily non-consensual, notwithstanding a previous agreement of indem-
nity between them; nevertheless, even a non-consensual surety might
reasonably be given a relational right of reimbursement against a prin-
cipal whose wrongdoing was the cause of his coming under liability and
so incurring suretyship risk. 2 The authorities do not settle the question.
If a right of reimbursement is denied, the employer on compensating
the tortfeasee clearly acquires a quasi-contractual right against the wrong-
doing employee, the benefit to the latter consisting in his relief from tort
liability.63 If reimbursement is given, however, there seems to be little
justification for quasi-contractual redress. Indeed, there is authority for
the proposition that a paying surety is denied a quasi-contractual right
against the principal whenever the former already has a right of re-
imbursement which affords an effective and commensurate remedy. 4
The employer may compensate the injured person without having been
first sued by him,6 5 and have recovery over in the lesser of two sums,
namely, the amount.so paid and the damage suffered by the injured per-
son. If, however, the injured person brings an action against the em-
ployer, judgment recovered therein without fraud or collusion is con-
clusive6 on the agent, in a later action brought by the employer against
the agent, as to the existence and amount of the employer's liability and
all matters necessarily involved in such liability, provided that the agent
had adequate opportunity to defend the former action by being a party
thereto or by being called on by the employer to take over or participate
in the defence thereof, whether he did so or not. In proceeding on any
of the theories of reimbursement, as distinguished from quasi-contract
and subrogation, the employer has the advantage of incidental reimburse-
ment, that is, if he successfully resisted an action brought by the tort-
feasee he may have reimbursement from the agent for costs, necessary
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred in defending the action, and
so, even though the resistance proved unsuccessful, if he defended at the
62. It is conceivable that the employer's recovery may also be rested on a right of
reimbursement incident to the relation of principal and agent; but the Restatement of
Agency, § 438, seems to place the redress, at least in all ordinary cases, on an agreement
expressed or implied in fact.
63. Cf. Brown v. Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 189 (C. P. 1811); WooDwARD ON QUASI CON~cT;S
(1913) § 258, subsection 4. Quasi-contractual recovery is at law and rests on the legal
discharge of the liability of the agent; subrogation is in equity and proceeds on the principle
of saving the cause of action of the tortfeasee and passing it to the surety.
64. Jackson v. McKeown, 79 Colo. 447, 246 Pac. 277 (1926), CAMPBELiS CASES Ox1
SURETsMP 27; Appleton v. Bascom, 3 Metc. 169 (Mass. 1841).
65. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875).
66. Fedden v. Brooklyn Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N. Y. Supp. 9 (2nd Dep't,
1923). But cf. Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900) (only prima facie effect).
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request of the agent, '7 or if he acted reasonably and in good faith in un-
dertaking and conducting the defence. These principles, being of general
application to situations where one is "answerable over" to another, 
C3
govern other cases discussed in this subtopic.
(2) When an initial carrier, because of the contract of carriage or
statute, is liable to the shipper for loss of or damage to goods resulting
from the fault of a connecting carrier, or occurring while in the possession
of the latter, the initial carrier on compensating the shipper may have
compensation from the connecting carrier.09 Likewise, a carrier, who
came under liability by virtue of his absolute duty to transport and de-
liver goods safely, may have compensation from an agent or other person
whose culpable act or omission caused the loss of or damage to the
goods, 0 or against a wilful or profiting converter to whom the carrier
misdelivered them by mistake;' and a carrier who is liable for a deft-
ciency in the quantity of goods under a bill of lading issued by him in
reliance on an untrue representation of the consignor is entitled to com-
pensation from the latter.72 These results may be rested on a right of
subrogation and possibly of reimbursement, both incident to the rela-
tion of surety and principal or, if reimbursement be denied, on quasi-
contractual grounds.
(3) If in any case an occupier of land73 or the owner of an animal is
under absolute liability for damage resulting from the culpable act or
omission of another, the occupier or owner on making the injured person
whole should have compensation from the other on grounds of subroga-
67. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874).
68. SEDGWICIC oN DASiAGEs (9th ed. 1912) §§ 236, 241, 803, 834, 982. The authorities
are divided on the question whether notice or other opportunity to defend the former
action is a prerequisite of incidental reimbursement. It is not in cases of consensual surety-
ship, SmnwscE, sPtra § SOS; no more should it be here, though failure to give such notice
may well be considered a fact bearing on the reasonableness of plaintiff's defence. See
Ryerson v. Chapman, 66 Me. 557 (1877) (warranty of realty; held that failure to give
notice is not fatal to plaintiff's incidental recovery, but merely leaves the defendant un-
concluded); SEDGw]cK o.v DAuAGrEs §§ 239, 241a. Contra: Westfield v. Mayo, 122 Mass.
100 (1877) (dictum); Chase v. Bennett, 59 N. H. 394 (1879); Hubbard v. Gould, 74 N. H.
25 (1906) (dictum); and see Yokum v. Thomas, 15 Iowa 67 (1863).
69. Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox Rr. Co., 24 How. 247 (U. S. 1860); Chicago
& North Western Ry. Co. v. Northern Line Packet Co., 70 Ill. 217, 223 (1873) (dictum).
Such indemnification is expressly provided for in the Carmack Amendment of June 29, 1906,
to the Interstate Commerce Act, 34 StAr. 593, 49 U. S. C. A. § 20 (1929). Notes (1911)
31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 70; (1928) 53 A. L. R. 1004, 1016. Like indemnification may be had
in the case of misrouting. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Eastin & Knox, 100 Tex. 556, S62, 102
S. W. 105, 107 (1907).
70. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875); Georgia Ry. Co. v. Jossay, 105 Ga. 271,
31 S. E. 179 (1898).
71. Brown v. Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 189 (C. P. 1811).
72. Van Santen v. Standard Oil Co., 81 N. Y. 171 (1880).
73. Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (186S).
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tion or perhaps of reimbursement incident to suretyship or, if reimburse-
ment be refused, on the theory of quasi contract. 4
D. Relation between Two Persons under Tort Liability because oj
Fault, when One of Them in Equity and Good Conscience should Bear
the Ultimate Burden of Compensation
The cases presenting this situation may be mostly classified as in-
stances of command, creation of risk, control, and last clear chance.
(1) When one person innocently commits a tort by specific direction
of another, the former on compensating the tortfeasee may have com-
pensation from the latter. Thus, a servant or other agent who inno-
ceitly commits a tortious act by specific direction of his master or other
principal,7 or a carrier who does so by order of the shipper,"0 or an in-
dependent contractor by order of his employer, 77 is entitled to compen-
sation from the other person even though the latter be himself innocent.18
And if, by direction of an attaching or execution creditor or foreclosing
mortgagee, acting personally or by agent,70 or by direction of any other
person beneficially interested in the process,80 or of his attorney,1 a
sheriff, constable or other officer innocently commits a .tort by seizing
specifically designated goods of another person, the officer on compen-
sating the tortfeasee may have compensation from the person so directing
him. In all these instances it would seem that compensation may be
rested on the subrogation due to a surety; or frequently on a right of
reimbursement arising from a promise express or implied in fact; or
possibly on a relational right of reimbursement which even a non-con-
sensual surety may have against a principal who is responsible for his
coming under liability and thereby incurring the suretyship risk; 82 and
74. Supra, note 64.
75. Howe v. Buffalo Rr. Co., 37 N. Y. 297, 298 (1867) (conductor ejecting passenger);
Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 Pac. 512 (1903), TiuRSrON'S CASES ON QUASX CO1mA'rA
513 (agent taking possession of chattels); Ladd v. Town of Waterbury, 34 Vt, 426, 427
(1861) (statutory) ; Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66 (C. P. 1827) (auctioneer selling goods);
Ann. Cas. 1912D, 990.
76. Betts v. Gibbins, 2 A. & E. 57 (K. B. 1834) (alternative decision).
77. Horrabin v. Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N. W. 988 (1924) (contractor tres-
passing on real estate).
78. Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 Pac. 833 (1896) (agent-trustee procuring eject-
ment of one in possession of realty by a court without jurisdiction).
79. Henderson v. Eckern, 115 Minn. 410, 132 N. W. 715, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 989 (1911).
'80. Gower v. Emery, 18 Me. 79, 83 (1841).
81. Higgins v. Russo, 72 Conn. 238 (1899).
82. Thus in Howe v. Buffalo Rr. Co., 37 N. Y. 297, 299 (1867), where indemnity was
given in an action at law, Porter,, J., said: "In respect to the right of the latter (conductor
ejecting passenger) to indemnity, he stood to the defendant (directing railroad cornpany)
in the relation of a surety; and it is well settled that in such a case, the acceptance by the




sometimes on principles of quasi contract.P Either the promised or the
relational right of reimbursement should be attended by a right of inci-
dental reimbursement for costs, necessary attorneys' fees and other ex-
penses incurred in reasonably and faithfully, though unsuccessfully,
undertaking and conducting a defence to an action brought by the tort-
feasee.s4
(2) When one person is under tort liability because he culpably created
a dangerous situation and another is liable because he failed to discover
and remove the danger, the latter person on compensating the tortfeasee
will be given full redress against the former, not only in cases in which
the latter is thought by the courts merely to have violated an affirmative
duty to make conditions safe, " *but even when he is recognized to have
been negligent, and therefore at fault, in failing to discover and remove
the danger.8 6 Thus, a delinquent municipality may be allowed indem-
nity from an abutting owner,87 a public service company, 8 or a contractor
engaged in public or private work, 9 who negligently created the unsafe
condition in a highway; 0 a delinquent owner of property or other con-
tractee may have recovery from a contractor, who negligently brought
about the dangerous situation; 91 a master failing to provide his servant
with a safe place for ingress and egress has been granted indemnity from
one who negligently set up a defective passageway and impliedly invited
the servant to use it;02 a neglectful public service company may have
redress from another public service company which culpably created the
dangerous condition in a street; 0 3 a delinquent owner of abutting premises
may have recovery from a person who negligently created a dangerous
condition in the premises which worked harm to travelers in the high-
In cases of agency a relational right of reimbursement may also be predicated, parhaps,
on the consensual relation of agent and principal. But see the rESTATLmI-T, Acixcr
(1932) § 438.
83. It is evident that the elements of a quasi-contractual right are present, including
benefit conferred on the defendant in his relief from tort liability. There is authority for
the proposition, however, that a paying surety does not acquire a quasi-contractual right
against the principal when an effective and commensurate right of reimbursement already
exists. Jackson v. McKeown, 79 Colo. 447, 246 Pac. 277 (1926); Appleton v. Bamcom,
3 Metc. 169 (A'ass. 1841).
84. SEDGwicx o.; DA orGEs §§ 236, 241; supra, note 68.
85. Note (1912) 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147.
86. Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock Co., 32 F. (2d) 182, 183 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929);
Notes (1912) 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 583; (1912) 40 id. 1165, 1169.
87. Note (1908) 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 949.
88. Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316 (1896).
89. Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 566, 575.
90. Note (1912) 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1165; L. R. A. 1916F 86.
91. Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 566.
92. Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock Co., 32 F. (2d) 182 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
93. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. East Texas Co., 48 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
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way;94 and one who is liable to an employee, invitee, or second purchaser
because of his negligent failure to discover dangerous defects in an
appliance or commodity is entitled to indemnity from a person who
negligently manufactured and furnished the same. 0
There are several theories of compensation in cases of this class, as
well as in those discussed in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subtopic.
One theory is that the defendant committed an actionable tort on the
plaintiff, although the plaintiff was himself negligent and his negligence
resulted in his being liable to the tortfeasee; and that the damage proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's conduct includes not only the amount
of compensation paid to the tortfeasee but also incidental expenditures
for costs, necessary attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred by the
plaintiff in the course of a defence undertaken and conducted reasonably
and in good faith.96 Another theory is that of quasi-contractual re-
covery at law for the benefit nonofficiously conferred on the defendant
at the plaintiff's expense by discharging the defendant's liability to the
tortfeasee. 7 Again, the.plaintiff has a right of subrogation and, it may
be, of reimbursement, main"8 and incidental,"0 in consequence of the
relation of surety and principal existing between himself and the person
who is responsible for his incurring liability.
While the plaintiff claiming indemnification under the rules stated in
this subtopic might have safely compensated the tortfeasee without having
been first sued,100 yet if he is so sued and judgment is recovered against
him without fraud or collusion, that judgment will be conclusive in the
later action for compensation as to the existence and amount of the
plaintiff's liability, and matters necessarily involved in such liability, 0 1
94. Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149 (1873).
95. Boston Woven Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N. E. 657, 51 L. R, A. 781,
(1901) (recovery on theory either of tort or of contract) ; Wanamaker v, Otis Elevator Co,,
228 N. Y. 192, 126 N. E. 718 (1920); Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Hooker Electro-
chemical Co., 240 N. Y. 37, 147 N. E. 351 (1925); Note (1912) 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153,
1156. In Mowbray v. Merryweather, [18951 1 Q. B. 857, recovery over by a stevedore
against a ship owner, whose default may have been merely passive, was rested on the ground
of the implied warranty of the fitness of appliances furnished.
96. SEDGWICK Ox DAMAGES §§ 236, 241; supra, note 68.
97. But see note 83, supra.
98. Taking the view that the plaintiff is not limited to quasi-contractual recovery or
subrogation, but has a right of reimbursement for caused loss, one may still agree with
Lowell v. Boston & Lowell Rr. Co., 23 Pick. 24, 35 (Mass. 1839), and Lowell v. Short, 4
Cush. 275 (Mass. 1849), in which cases a non-culpable municipality was limited to recovery
of single damages from the person who was responsible for the unsafe condition of a high-
way, although by force of statute the municipality had had to pay double damages to the
tortfeasee; for the additional damages were in the nature of a fine, which the policy under-
lying the statute forbade the municipality to recover from the wrongdoer.
99. SEvGWICX ON DArAGE:s §§ 236, 241. 100. Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 566, 589.
101. City of Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N. Y. 65, 67 (1878) (judgment held con-
clusive as to the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the third person),
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provided that the defendant had opportunity to defend the former action
either as being already a party thereto or as having been expressly or
impliedly called on to defend it.
0 2
(3) When two persons are each under liability for culpably failing to
correct a dangerous condition, one being in control thereof, and the
other not, the latter may have compensation from the former on making
the tortfeasee whole.'0 3
(4) When one person is liable for negligently creating the dangerous
situation, and another person is liable because he later had the '"ast
clear chance" to avoid the injury (knowing of the danger or, perhaps,
having reason to know of it) and yet acted culpably and thus contri-
buted to the injury, the former is entitled to compensation from the
latter, not only for damage to his own person or property, but also for
damages paid by him to the third person. 0 4
E. The Position of an Indemnitor of a Tortfeasor In Respect to a Co-
Tortfeasor
The indemnitor is rarely a surety. In the first place, if he undertakes
merely to compensate the indemnitee for loss suffered by the latter be-
cause of liability to a tortfeasee, and if there is no statute vesting in the
tortfeasee a substantive right of compensation against the indemnitor,
the former has no right against the latter; 105 and, secondly, even though
the indemnitor promises the indemnitee to relieve him from liability by
102. Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418, 423 (U. S. 1862), 4 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1865);
Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 566, 576.
103. Kinloch Tel. Co. v. St. Louis, 268 Mo. 485, 188 S. W. 182 (1916) (probably;
municipality against public service company); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania
Espanola, 134 N. Y. 461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892), 144 N. Y. 663, 39 N. E. 360 (1895) (lOeor
against lessee); Trustees of Canandaigua v. Foster, 156 N. Y. 354, 50 N. E. 971, 41 L. R. A.
554 (1898) (city against abutting owner). And see Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418, 423
(U. S. 1862), 4 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1866); Geo. A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U. S.
489 (1918) (contractor who compensated injured employee of subcontractor given indemnity
from an employer in control of negligently acting servant) ; cf. Seward v. National Surety
Co., 120 Ohio St. 47, 165 N. E. 537 (1929); CAMPBELL'S CASES O.1 SURvSm= 203.
In Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American & Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316
(1932), the defendant had installed a fire-alarm system on plaintiffs property and negligently
allowed a wire to sag with the result that an employee bf plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff
compensated the employee and was given indemnity against the defendant on the ground
that the latter had contracted to maintain the system. In Taylor v. 3. A. Jones Con-struction
Co., 195 N. C. 30, 141 S. E. 492 (1928), however, an employee of a sub-contractor, who
was injured through failure to provide a safe working place, recovered judgment against the
contractor as weli as the sub-contractor, and it was held that the former would not be
entitled to indemnity or contribution from the latter since both knew of the danger.
104. Colorado & Southern Ry. Co. v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 122,
126, 214 Pac. 30, 36, 37 (1923); Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester & Nashua Co.,
62 N. H. 159 (1882); Notes (1934) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 130, 153; (1912) 36 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 583, 587.
105. Notes (1925) 25 Cot. L. Rnv. 661 (1931); 44 HAnv. L. RLv. 470.
19351
YALE LAW JOURNAL
compensating the tortfeasee, so that the latter has the right of an obligee-
beneficiary against him, or a statute gives the tortfeasee a substantive
right of compensation against him,100 still the relation between indemni-
tor and indemnitee is not that of surety and principal, but of principal
and surety, respectively, for as a consequence of the enforceable contract
between them, the ultimate loss should fall on the indemnitor rather than
the indemnitee.
1 0 7
The tendency of the law is to place the indemnitor in a position similar
to that of the indemnified tortfeasor in respect to the co-tortfeasor. In
many states a negligent tortfeasor, and in most states a wilful tortfeasor,
is denied the right of contribution against a co-tortfeasor.108 Certain
social and procedural reasons have been thought to require this result.
The supposed social reason is that denial of contribution tends to prevent
designful, reckless and even negligent action.1" The supposed proce-
dural reasons are found in a not unnatural repugnance of the courts to
relieve a tortfeasor from the consequences of his tort in whole or part,
especially when it involves turpitude, and the impropriety of spending
time in distributing losses between wrongdoers while more deserving liti-
gants await redress. It cannot be denied, however, that the rule against
contribution contravenes the principle of effecting equality of burden
among persons under like risk, and that it also gives to the tortfeasee the
power of casting the ultimate burden on one or the other of the tortfeasors
through fortuitous, capricious or collusive action. 10
Courts which deny contribution to a tortfeasor usually deny it to his
indemnitor."1 It is evident that if the indemnitor reimburses the in-
106. See VAzcF oN INsuRA_cE § 178; Rica:AMs Ox INsURANC §§ 503-506.
107. Cf. the statement of Pitney, V. C., in Beacon Lamp Co. v. Travellers Ins, Co,,
61 N. J. Eq. 59, 66, 47 At. 579, 582 (1900).
108. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tort easors (1932) 81 U. oF PA. L. REV.
130, 139, 140 (an illuminating article); Ann. Cas. 1913B, 938.
109. In truth, it might well be thought that the rule of no contribution, If regarded
by him at all, is more heartening than disheartening to a prospective tortfeasor; the element
of chance would likely appeal to such a person.
110. The rule denying contribution between negligent tortfeasors is not a necessary
consequence of the common law rule that contributory negligence precludes liability for
negligence instead of leading to ratable liability. It is true that the policy of deterrence
will be served not less effectively here than there. But, on the other hand, the rule of
contributory negligence leads to no such anomaly as the power of capricious disposition of
loss. Moreover, there would likely be less serious procedural difficulties here than there;
for frequently the quantum of contribution would be determined here simply by dividing
the amount of a judgment, already recovered and paid, by the number of tortfeasors.
111. Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921) [but cf. Salter v.
Lombardi, 116 Cal. App. 602, 3 P. (2d) 38 (1931)]; Smith v. Fall River School District,
1 Cal. (2d) 331, 334, 34 P. (2d) 994, 996 (1934) ; United States Casualty Co. v. Cincinnati,
New Orleans, & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 218 Ky. 455, 291 S. W. 709 (1927); Fiorentino v.
Adkins, 9 N. J. Misc. 446, 154 At. 429 (1931); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio
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demnitee he will fail of contribution in states denying it to the latter,
inasmuch as he is equitably entitled only to such rights as the latter has.
But if he exonerates the indemnitee by paying the tortfeasee, as he usu-
ally does because he is legally bound to do so or expediency so requires,
he may cogently argue that being a nonofficious payor he is subrogated
to the right of the tortfeasee against the co-tortfeasor. Whether he should
be so subrogated in whole or part is essentially a question between him-
self and the co-tortfeasor, and depends on economic and social considera-
tions as well as those of equity and good conscience.
Full subrogation is obviously improper, since this would allow a tort-
feasor, A, by procuring indemnity, to throw the whole ultimate burden
on any co-tortfeasor, B, in every instance; for, under a rule of full subro-
gation, if C, the tortfeasee, should recover from A, the latter would have
recovery from the indemnitor, I, and I from B; whereas, if C (or I, as
above indicated) should recover from B, the latter could have no redress
against A either in whole or part.
Whether contributory subrogation should be given to I, the indemnitor,
is a closer question. The courts have generally been inclined to place I
in a vicarious position for A, since Ps intervention has lessened A's urge
to careful conduct. But the question should not be so summarily dis-
missed. It may be well argued for I that he has not been in fault, as
A was, and that C should not have accidental, capricious or collusive
control over the ultimate incidence of the burden. Moreover, most con-
tracts of indemnity are made by casualty companies, which commonly,
because of legal obligation or out of a desire to have the good will of
the insuring public, pay the tortfeasee, either before or after judgment,
without regard to the solvency of the indemnitee or the suffering of loss
by him; hence in practice liability insurance is socially beneficial in that
it affords to tortfeasees a safeguard against the tortfeasors' inability or
unwillingness to pay. It may be answered that to refuse contribution
has the merit of tending to induce the indemnitor to examine the risk and
cancel the indemnity contract when the risk is too great; and, much
more potently, that to allow contribution to an indemnitor while refusing
it to a tortfeasor is to enable the latter, through the device of indemnity,
to get an undue advantage over any co-tortfeasor who has been unwilling
or unable to procure indemnity; for, if C should recover from A, the
indemnitee, the latter would have full recovery from I, and I one half
St. 582, 173 N. E. 194 (1930); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 OkLa. 25, 267 Pac.
641 (1928); Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 1486.
A like result was reached in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Christenson, 183 Minn. 182, 236
N. W. 618 (1931), where the indemnitor of A, a tortfeasor who had knowingly acted in
violation of a traffic regulation, was denied contribution from B, a merely negligent co-
tortfeasor, on the ground that A would not have been so entitled, though he would have
been if he had been merely negligent.
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from B, whereas, if C should recover from B, the latter, because of his
participation in the tort, would have no contribution from A or I; thus
the risk of A (and his indemnitor) would range from nothing to one half,
and that of B from one half to the whole. To this reasoning the indemni-
tor may reply, first, that in practice it is I, and not either A or B, who
pays C, so that the undue advantage would be largely theoretical; and,
secondly, that in view of this practice the brunt of compensation, as well
as of litigation, falls on the casualty companies in the first instance and,
if contribution is denied, comes to rest on the insuring public in ease of
the non-insuring public. Hence, the case for contribution seems to be
much stronger than it may at first appear.
It is also to be observed that the cause of the paying indemnitor is not
advanced by his procuring an assignment of the claim or judgment against
the co-tortfeasor to be made to himself or another.1 12
It not infrequently happens, however, that there is an indemnitor for
each tort-feasor, for example, I for A and J for B. Whatever may be
the just result in the situation last discussed, it is submitted that here,
on paying C, I should have subrogational contribution from B or from J,
for the following reasons: (1) I was not in fault. (2) C's opportunity
for collusive control over the ultimate loss will otherwise be much greater
here, where there are two solvent indemnitors and C can play one against
the other. (3) The spoils which tortfeasees might gather out of such
collusive control would be had at the eventual expense of the insuring
public. (4) Not only may I have contribution from J, but he may have
to make contribution to him, so that I's urge to supervision over A is not
lessened. (5) A gets no advantage over B through indemnity, inasmuch
as B also has availed himself of that device, so that, if C attacks 1
(directly or through A), I will have contribution by subrogation from J
(immediately or through B), and if C recovers from J (directly or through
B), J will have subrogational contribution from I (immediately or through
A).
At all events, if there are two indemnitors for a single tortfeasor, it
seems clear that contribution should be had by either against the other,
112. Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921); Smith v. Fall River
School District, 1 Cal. (2d) 331, 34 P. (2d) 994 (1934); Fiorentino v. Adkins, 9 N. J.
Misc. 446, 154 AtI. 429 (1931); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 5829 589,
173 N. E. 194, 196 (1930); Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 1468, 1486, 1490. Otherwise, if the
tortfeasee be compensated by a person who is not an indemnitor or otherwise legally
obligated to the tortfeasor. Salter v. Lombardi, 116 Cal. App. 602, 3 P. (2d) 38 (1931);
Note 75 A. L. R. 1468, 1470.
113. For these reasons the writer believes that Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Union Indemnity Co., 141 Misc. 792, 253 N. Y. Supp. 324 (1st Dep't, 1929), 255 N. Y.
591, 175 N. E. 326 (1931), note 117, infra, to be erroneous, even aside from N. Y. Civz
PRAcicE AcT (1928) § 211a.
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whatever may be the conclusion reached on the question last discussed." 4
In not a few states a merely negligent tortfeasor is given contribution
from a co-tortfeasor." 5 In such jurisdictions the indemnitor who re-
imburses a negligent indemnitee will be equitably entitled to his right
of contribution against the co-tortfeasor. Likewise, the indemnitor who
pays a tortfeasee will be subrogated to his right against the co-tort-
feasor;1 6 but recovery will be limited to the contributive share of the
latter, since any greater recovery would result in improper indirect attack
upon the indemnitee and also in circuity of suit.- 7  The indemnitor and
the co-tortfeasor are really nonconsensual coprincipals, with incidental
rights of contributory subrogation.
Furthermore, there are exceptional situations in which, being liable to
C as tortfeasors, A and B are in the relation of surety and principal, so
that A is entitled to receive full compensation from B for any resulting
loss. In such cases I, the indemnuitor of A, if he reimburses A will be
equitably entitled to the latter's rights against B; and, if he exonerates
A by paying C, will be fully subrogated as surety to C's rights against
B,18 and against J, an indemnitor of B."- The reasons which justify
the relation of surety and principal between A and B support the like
relation between I and B (or J), respectively. Examples of such cases
are where A is liable to C, his employee, for damages resulting from the
negligent construction of a building or installation of an appliance by
B; 120 where A is liable to C, a business visitor, for harm resulting from
114. Compare the cases allowing contribution as between two employers liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior for the conduct of one joint employee, and those denying
contribution as between respective employers of different employees whose conduct con-
currently causes injury. Leflar, supra note 103, at 142, 143.
115. Note 108, supra. But not when the plaintiff was a wilful or conscious wrongdoer,
Boyer v. Bolender, .129 Pa. 324, 18 Ad. 127 (189), or acted in violation of statute, Fidelity
& Casualty Co. v. Christenson, 183 Minn. 182, 236 N. W. 618 (1931). For a recent decision
interpreting the GEoRG3A C=r CODE (1910) § 4588, see Southern Ry. Co. v. City of Rome,
179 Ga. 449, 176 S. E. 7 (1934), reversing 47 Ga. App. 489, 170 S. E. 695 (1933).
116. Hadcock v. Wiggins, 147 Misc. 252, 263 N. Y. Supp. 5.3 (Sup. Ct. 1933), being
of merely procedural significance, does not militate against the substantive right of the
indemnitor to have contribution from the co-tortfeasor.
117. Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 203 N. W. 13 (1926). Contra:
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 141 Misc. 792, 253 N. Y. Supp
324 (Sup. Ct. 1929), 255 N. Y. 591, 175 N. E. 326 (1931); the decision in that case Eeems
open to criticism on the ground that NEw YoRm I1ust=AcE L.%w, § 109, vctcd a caus of
action in C against I2, indemnitor of insolvent B, to which I, indemnitor of A, might well
have been held contributorily subrogated, not only for the reason stated in the text supra, but
also because N. Y. Cavi PRACiCE Acr (1928) § 211a, [Note (1930) 16 Co,=. L. Q. 246,
598], allowed contribution between co-tortfeasors subjected to a joint judgment.
118. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 254 N. Y. 37, 52,
147 N. E. 351, 355 (1925).
119. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Remond, 221 Ala. 349, 351, 129 So. 15,
17 (1930).
120. Lord & Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 230 N. Y. 132, 135, 129 N. E. 346 (1920).
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the negligent construction of an elevator or other appliance by B,121
or from a breach of warranty of operation of a safety device installed by
B;122 where A, a dealer, is liable to C, a purchaser of chemicals, for dam-
age caused by the negligent manufacture and sale thereof by B; 123 and
where A, in possession of premises, is liable to C, a pedestrian on the
sidewalk, for damage caused by negligent action on the part of B."
F. Rights of a Surety for a Tortfeasor to Receive Indemnity or Contri-
bution from a Co-Tortfeasor
The position of a surety is quite different from that of an indemnitor;
The surety should receive and not give indemnity. Accordingly, the
general principle would seem to be that a surety who makes the tort-
feasee whole is fully subrogated to the latter's right against the co-tort-
feasor,125 whether, under the facts of the case and the law of the parti-
cular jurisdiction, neither tortfeasor would be entitled to contribution
from the other, or either would be entitled to contribution but only to
that. The reason is that there is a nonconsensual relation of surety-
principal between the surety and the co-tortfeasor: both are bound to
the tortfeasee for the same performance, that is, compensation for the
tort; the tortfeasee can equitably exact compensation but once; and as
between the two the co-tortfeasor should bear the entire burden of com-
pensation, at least when he was in fault, and, it seems, when merely in
control. 28 It is to be observed that the surety is not exposed to any of
the arguments which forbid or may seem to forbid full or contributive
compensation to an indemnitor against the co-tortfeasor.12 7 Indeed, to
make the surety for one tortfeasor surety for the other as well, and thus
give to him full subrogation against either, is merely to substitute the
surety for the tortfeasee on payment; true, the surety may now recover
from either of the tortfeasors and, where they were in such fault as to
preclude contribution, may thus fix the ultimate loss capriciously or
collusively, but the tortfeasee could have done the like. Furthermore,
if the co-tortfeasor also has a surety, it would seem that the two sureties
would be in the relation of co-suretyship, since they are each responsible
121. Wanamaker v. Otis Elevator Co., 228 N. Y. 192, 126 N. E. 718 (1920).
122. London Guarantee Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 86 Ind. App. 150, 195 N. E. 182 (1927).
123. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 N. Y, 37, 147
N. E. 351 (1925).
124. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. International Milk Products Co., 192 App.
Div. 88, 182 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1920).
125. Agren v. Staker, 46 Idaho 36, 267 Pac. 460 (1928). CAMPBEL'S CASES 01 SURannsMP,
129.
126. Cf. Seward v. National Surety Co., 120 Ohio St. 47, 165 N. E. 537 (1929).
127. No circuity of action or improper indirect attack is involved; no lesening of the




for the same performance and for the same principals, consensually for
one and nonconsensually for the other.ms
If, however, a tortfeasee, C, has already obtained judgment against one
tortfeasor, A, or both tortfeasors, A and B, and a surety, S, becomes
bound for A on his bond merely to stay execution or on his appeal or
supersedeas bond given for a like purpose in prosecuting an appeal or
writ of error, a variation of risk is involved which usually results in
placing S in the like position in respect to B as A is in. Thus, in a state
which recognizes that A and B are co-principals, with rights of contribu-
tion inter se, S and B will be in like relation, with like rights.m S should
have no right greater than contribution against B, since B may possibly
have been damaged by the stay, and therefore his risk varied, to the
extent of his right of contribution against A. S should have no less right,
since B cannot have suffered greater damage.130 For like reasons B
should have a right of contribution against S, no greater and no less.
On the other hand, in states which for real or alleged reasons of policy
and procedure deny contribution between A and B, recovery should be
refused between S and B.-' But for the stay, C might have recovered
128. The writer is, therefore, obliged to disagree with the opinion of the majority of the
court in National Surety Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding Co., 19 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927),
C&,A BELL'S CASES ON SnnRv snp, 158. He submits that the dissenting opinion of Sman,
J-, is the better reasoned.
129. Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 285 Pa. 116, 131 At!. 665 (1926), 292 Pa. 3S4,
365, 141 At!. 231, 235 (1928).
130. This reasoning is supported by two well-settled rules of suretyschip: (1) that varia-
tion of risk by an extension of time given by the creditor to the principal discharges a
surety, and (2) that such variation effected by the intervention of a new surety and without
act of the creditor interposes the new surety between the principal and the old surety. It
is to be observed that, while reversal of the judgment in the situation under disL.'-ion may
benefit the old surety, it will not necessarily do so, as it will in the case of succenic appeal
bonds.
While the writer regards the two rules just referred to as unsound in principle, neverthe-
less he believes that consistency requires that they be carried over to the closely analogous
situations of co-suretyship and coprincipalship, and hence ventures to make the statement
in the text to which this footnote is appended. The cases mostly relate to the carrying over
of the first rule. By the weight of authority, it and certain similar rules are extended to
situations of co-suretyship. WmxrasroN oN Co.TMAcrs § 1263; CA .rI,'aSr's CASES oNz SUrxnm-
s , 422, 423, n. 1, 449, n. 1. But most authorities refuse to extend it and similar rules to
situations of coprincipalship. Thus, a creditor may covenant never to sue one principal, Wxr-
LI?-To o-N CoNTRACTs § 338; or extend time to one principal, Davenport v. King, 63 Ind. 64
(1878); Mullendore v. Wertz, 75 Ind. 431, 435 (1881); Parsons v. Harrold, 46 W. Va. 122,
123, 32 S. E. 1102 (1899) ; Neel v. Harding, 2 Mete. 247, 250 (Ky. 1889) (dictum); Wxz.s-
TON, supra § 340; or, as it was held in Parsons v. Harrold, supra, surrender security to a
principal, without discharging the coprincipal even ratably.
131. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 588, 173 N. E. 194, 196, 75 A. L. R.
1481 (1930) (alternative decision). Contra: Kolb v. National Surety Co., 176 N. Y. 233,
68 N. E. 247 (1903) (subrogation to agreed amount less than contributive Jhare; alternative
decision rendered before enactment of Civi PnAc-ncE AcT (1928) § 211a, which gave con-
tribution between tortfeasors bound by joint judgment); Rosenthal v. New York Rys. Co.,
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from A, in which event A would have had no recourse against B. Because
of and during the stay, C can attack only B, who cannot have redress
against A, so that B's risk has been varied seriously and in toto. Amends
can best be made to B by placing S in a position like that of A; that is, if
C recovers from S, the latter should not have contribution from B, any
more than A would have had; justice to B requires so much; on the other
hand, if C recovers from B, the latter should have no contribution from S,
and thus indirectly from A; reasons of policy and procedure forbid B
to have relief against S as much as against A. Thus, in cases of stay
bonds, in states which would deny contribution between A and B, the
law should recognize no relation and no rights of recourse between S and
B, just as it recognizes none between A and B. Whatever may be thought
of this reasoning, S, surety for A on the appeal bond, must be denied
any redress against B in a case where he had originally indemnified A
against liability; in such case, according to the authorities, had he paid
the tortfeasee without appeal, he would have been denied any redress
against B, the co-tortfeasor. To give him even contributory subrogation
now would be to allow him to better his position merely by taking an
appeal and becoming surety for A on the appeal bond.8 2
It remains to be said that B cannot justly object to the variation of
his risk by the extension of time if he consents thereto or if he previ-
ously or subsequently varies the risk of A by himself appealing and giving
a supersedeas bond with S2 as surety. In either event variation of risk
should have no bearing on the present relation between S and B. Con-
sequently, S, consensual surety for A, is nonconsensual surety for B;113
and S2, consensual surety for B, is likewise nonconsensual surety for A.
Moreover, S and S2 are co-sureties, since they are sureties for the same
principals and the same performance."0 4 It has been held, however, that
B will not be adversely affected if he separately appeals without giving
a bond.'35 It may be that because B himself appeals he should not object
109 Misc. 210, 179 N. Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (full subrogation given); Smith v. Fall
River School District, 1 Cal. (2d) 331, 334, 34 P. (2d) 994, 996 (1934) (dictum); and see
City of White Plains v. Ellis, 113 Misc. 5, 9, 184 N. Y. Supp. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1920), afi'd 200
App. Div. 869, 192 N. Y. Supp. 920 (1922). It is difficult to harmonize these New York
cases with the doctrine of Hinckley v. Kreitz, 58 N. Y. 583 (1874), CA.PBELL'S CASES ON
SURETYs'm , 199. Note (1932) 77 A. L. R. 452.
132. Smith v. Fall River School District, 1 Cal. (2d) 331, 338, 34 P. (2d) 994, 998 (1934)
(replacing prior opinion in 26 P. (2d) 37 (1933); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio
St. 582, 173 N. E. 194, 75 A. L. R. 1481 (1930).
133. Agren v. Staker, 46 Idaho 36, 267 Pac. 460 (1928).
134. id.
135. Smith v. Fall River School District, 1 Cal. (2d) 331, 34 P. (2d) 994 (1934) (re-
placing prior opinion in 26 P. (2d) 37 (1933), holding that S was wholly ,denied subroga.
tion to C's right against B); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 285 Pa. 116, 131 Atl. 665




to his co-defendant prosecuting or having prosecuted a completely effec-
tive appeal, that is, an appeal with bond to stay process, but on the other
hand, while A has varied B's risk, the latter has done nothing to vary the
risk of the former.
In those exceptional situations in which two tortfeasors, A and B, are
respectively in the relation of surety and principal, 130 S2, a surety on the
appeal bond of B, because of variation of A's risk, is interposed between
B and A, so that S2 will have no recourse against A and A will be fully
subrogated to the rights of C, the tortfeasee, against B and S2. And
if A appeals and gives bond with S as surety, Si will be so subrogated as
against B and S2 since they were already principals as to A and hence
their risks have not been varied by the undertaking of S1 37  Further-
more, Si, surety on the appeal bond of A, and also I, indemnitor of A,
will be subrogated to such rights as C has against J, indemnitor of B,"'
since J is a principal in respect to B.130
G. Relation between Insurers, Mortgagees and Mortgagors
The cases involving such situations generally fall within three classes:
(1) The mortgagee at his own expense may procure insurance on his
interest in the mortgaged property. In such cases the insurer is in effect
contingently responsible for the payment of the mortgage debt and is
thus surety for the mortgagor, or subsequent owner, or both;4 0 for if
the mortgagor or owner does not pay the mortgagee, the insurer must
do so, contingently on loss and within the limits of the loss and of the
insurance. On the other hand, if the mortgagor or owner pays the debt
before loss, the insurer is relieved of risk, and, if the mortgagor or owner
pays the debt after loss, the insurer should be equally relieved of liability,
at least in equity, since its contract was essentially one of indemnity and
136. See appropriate subtopics, supra.
137. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capital City Surety Co., 224 App. Div. SCD, 231 N. Y.
Supp. 169, (1st Dep't, 1928).
138. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Remand, 221 Ala. 349, 351, 129 So. 15, 17
(1930).
139. In City Trust Etc. Co. v. Haaqlocher, 101 App. Div. 415, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1022 (Ist
Dep't, 1905), a surety on the appeal bond of a sole tortfeasor was properly given full redress
against the indemnitor of the tortfeasor.
140. It is to be observed that the mortgagee may recover from the insurer without
having first realized on, and without making allowance for, any undestroyed portion of the
mortgaged property, Excelsior Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 343, 354 (1873);
or from the mortgagor by action on the debt or foreclosure of the mortgage without account-
ing for any proceeds of the insurance. Note (190S) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143; VAs.cC oni I-
suRAcE §§ 170-171. But the mortgagee may not recover from both and retain for himejf
more than the amount of the debt; the statement to the contrary in King v. State Mutual
Ins. Co., 7 Cush. 1, 4 (Mass. 1851), confirmed in Suffolk Ins. Co. v. Boyden, 9 Allen 123
(Mass. 1864), is opposed by the many authorities giving subrogation to the imurcr and is
practically nullified by Ass. GFN. LAWS (1932) c. 175, § 99.
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the accidental sequence of events should make no difference. Hence it
is generally held that the insurer is subrogated to the debt and mort-
gage,141 even in the absence of stipulation in the policy to that effect,14
2
the right of subrogation becoming operative when the mortgagee receives
full payment of the debt.1' Accordingly, the mortgagor or owner is
denied subrogation to the insurance."' It is true that the insurer has
been compensated for its risk and hence the mortgagor or owner may
contend that he should be subrogated to the insurance instead of the
insurer being subrogated to the debt and mortgage. But the compensa-
tion did not proceed from the mortgagor or owner; moreover, the question
remains what is the insurer's risk, its ultimate risk, for which compensa-
tion was made, and that depends in part on whether it is subrogated or
not; and, lastly, legal recognition of the insurer's right of subrogation
will normally be reflected in diminution of the particular premium or class
of premiums or of premiums generally.
A like result has been reached in England in the case pf vendor and
purchaser of real estate: the insurer of the vendor on making him whole
is held to be subrogated to the vendor's rights against the purchaser. 143
141. And also, it seems, to other security for the debt. Sussex County Ins. Co. v.
Woodruff, 2 Dutcher 541, 550 (N. J. L. 1857) (arguendo).
142. Leyden v. Lawrence, 79 N. J. Eq. 113 (1911) ; Excelsior Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins,
Co., 55 N. Y. 343, 359 (1873) (arguendo); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Reid, 171 N. C. 513, 88
S. E. 779 (1916) (conditional sale, likened to chattel mortgage); Carpenter v. Providence
Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495, 501 (U. S. 1842) (dictum); Norwich Fire Ins. Co. v. Boomer, 52 Ill.
442, 446 (1869) (dictum); Note (1906) 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79. Contra: Suffolk Fire Ins. Co.
v. Boyden, 9 Allen 123 (Mass. 1864) [now practically nullified by Mass. Gen. Laws (1932)
c. 175 § 99].
143. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 85 Va. 765, 767 (1889); Note (1920) 9
A. L. R. 1596, 1607.
144. Lawrence v. Union Ins. Co., 80 N. J. L. 133, 76 AtI. 1053 (1910).
145. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 380 (1883). The opposite view prevailing in many
states of this country rests, not only on the doctrine that as between vendor and purchaser
the latter is equitable owner and incurs the risk of loss, but also on the view that the pur-
chaser is justly entitled to the benefit of insurance procured by the vendor on the property
sold although there was no agreement between them to that effect. VANCT ON INSURANCE
§ 172. -Notes (1925) 37 A. L. R. 1324; (1926) 40 id. 607; (1927) 51 id. 929; CUAn_ AND
Sw'soN's CASES ON EQuITy (1934) 965-976. Thus, in Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America
v. Robinson-Siagle Lumber Co., Inc., 147 So. 542 (La. App. 1933), the plaintiff had In-
stalled a sprinkler system for the defendant, title to remain in the plaintiff until purchase
price should be paid and defendant to keep the same insured for the benefit of the plaintiff;
defendant did not insure the system, but plaintiff did, the policy not providing for subroga-
tion; loss having occurred, plaintiff received the amount thereof from the insurer under a
"loan agreement"; in this action prosecuted in behalf of the insurer, it was held that the
"insurance money" inured to the benefit of the defendant, and that the loan agreement did
not help the plaintiff's case. But see Cadillac Automobile Co. v. Fisher, 172 Atl. 393 (R. I.
1934) (sale of motor car; policy against theft running to seller and buyer "as their interests
may appear," but cancelled as to buyer; loss paid to seller under loan agreement; Judgment
given for seller against buyer).
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(2) On the other hand, the mortgagor (or owner), or the mortgagee at
the latter's expense, may procure insurance on the mortgagor's or owner's
interest in the mortgaged property, it being originally or subsequently
provided that the amount of the loss, if any, shall be payable to the
mortgagee as his interest may appear. The result is that the mortgagee
acquires by original designation or subsequent assignment, as the case
may be, a security interest in the rights of the mortgagor or owner aris-
ing under the policy.4 ' Consequently, if the mortgagor or owner pays
the debt, he becomes solely entitled to the policy and its proceeds, just
as any debtor on payment of his debt is entitled to his property securing
the same; furthermore, if the insurer pays the amount of loss to the
mortgagee, it is not surety for the mortgagor or owner and not subrogated
to the debt or mortgage, since by the terms of the policy the insurer
should bear the ultimate burden of the loss rather than the mortgagor or
owner.1
47
(3) It remains to consider a situation which is identical with the one
last discussed, except that the policy contains a provision that in the
event of specified action or neglect on the part of the mortgagor or
owner, for example, vacancy, procurement of other insurance, or change
in title, the policy shall be invalidated, but not as to the mortgagee.
Such a policy, unlike that in cases of the second class, reasonably im-
ports that the insurer undertakes to indemnify the mortgagee in respect
to his interest as well as the mortgagor as to his interest, with the result
that the interest of the mortgagee is insured, although the interest of the
mortgagor or owner may cease to be so. 48 Hence, on the happening of
a specified event, the case is virtually reduced to one of the first class.
Although the mortgagor paid a premium to the insurer, he received the
full agreed equivalent therefor, that is, a defeasible assumption of risk.
Consequently, on paying the amount of the debt to the mortgagee,40 the
146. Grosvenor v. The Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 391 (1858); and see Buffalo Steam
Engine Works v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 401 (1858) (subsequent assignment).
147. Note L. R. A. 1916A 559, S60. A like decision has been reached where the mortgagor
procured insurance at his own expense but the policy named only the mortgagee as the
person indemnified. Norwich Fire Ins. Co. v. Boomer, 52 Il1. 442, 446 (1869). In the absence
of a mutual mistake in expression the soundness of this decision may be doubted, inasmuch
as it deprived the insurer of a justly expected right of subrogation. But where the mortgagee
procures insurance naming only himself as indemnitee, subrogation is granted to the insurer
and denied to the mortgagor, although under the terms of the mortgage the mortgagee might
have procured insurance protecting both at the mortgagors expense, Lawrence v. Union Ins.
Co., 80 N. J. L. 133, 76 Atl. 1053 (1910); and especially so if the policy provided for subro-
gation to the debt and mortgage, Foster v. Van Reed, 70 N. Y. 19, 26 (1877), in which case
the mortgagee attempted to charge the premium to the mortgagor.
148. Hastings v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 141, 148, 154 (1878); Eddy v.
London Assurance Corp., 143 N. Y. 311, 322, 38 N. E. 307, 309, 25 L. R. A. 6S6, 6S9 (1894).
149. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Price, 211 Ala. 155, 99 So. 848 (1924). Mortgage
clauses usually provide in effect that subrogation shall not impair the right of the mortgagee
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insurer, as surety, and independently of any provision to that effect in
the policy, will be effectively subrogated, not only to the mortgagee's right
on the bond or note, but also -to his mortgage title or lien, as against the
mortgagor or owner, 50  a second mortgagee or other junior incum-
brancer,' 5 ' and a surety for the mortgagor or owner.
152
Even more clearly will the insurer be entitled to subrogation under
such circumstances if, as is usually the case, the policy expressly so pro-
vides. Such a provision imports an agreement on the part of insurer,
mortgagee, and mortgagor (or owner) that the insurer shall be surety for
the mortgagor or owner and subrogated as such; 153 accordingly, the mort-
to recover the full amount of his claim. For the standard mortgage clause legally prescribed
for use in New York, see Ric mWDs ON INSURANCE, 934, 936, and McKmNry's CoNSOL. LAWS
(1929) INSURANCE, § 121; in Massachusetts, MASS. GEar. LAws (1932) c. 179, § 99. In
Clark v. Trainor, 237 Ill. App. 269 (1925), the policy did not so provide but only that the
insurer should be subrogated to the extent of the payment to the mortgagee's rights, and,
the insurer having paid the amount of the policy but less than the mortgage debt, it was held
that it should be ratably subrogated to the mortgage; this result may rest on a legitimate
interpretation of the provision but it is certainly not in keeping with general principles of
subrogation.
150. First Nat. Bank v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 104 Kan. 278, 178 Pac.
413 (1919); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 98 Neb. 446, 153 N. W. 553, L.
R. A. 1916A 784 (1915) (fraudulent representations made by mortgagor to insurer; no
agreement for subrogation appeared); Matter of Kip, 4 Edw. Ch. 86, 95 (N. Y. 1842).
Contra: Graves v. Hampden Fire Ins. Co., 10 Allen 281 (Mass. 1865) [now substantially
abrogated by MAss. Gm. LAws (1932) c. 175, § 99]; Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Ram-
sey, 76 Ore. 570, 149 Pac. 542 (1915); notes L. R. A. 1916A 559, 560; (1928) 52 A. L. R.
278, 282; (1929) 63 id. 1527.
Furthermore, if the mortgagor, instead of the insurer, should pay the mortgagee, the
mortgagor would be denied subrogation to the rights of the mortgagee on the policy; there
seems to be no escape from this conclusion; for, the policy being by its very terms invali-
dated as to the mortgagor, that is, as if never phrased for his protection, the mortgagor must
be denied indirect as well as direct recovery thereon. This offers additional support for the
proposition that the paying insurer will be subrogated to the debt and mortgage; other-
wise, the insured would have the power of accidental, capricious, or collusive action.
Moreover, the mortgagor cannot require the mortgagee to account for any payment re-
ceived by him from the insurer. Note (1908) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143, 144.
151. Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So. 807 (1930). It
is to be observed that subrogation as against a second mortgagee or other junior incumbrancer
is sustainable only on the theory that the insurer has become a surety, and hence is some.
thing more than a mere nonofficious payor of the debt of another.
152. Thus, let it be supposed that the mortgagor took out the policy and assigned It with
the consent of the insurer to an assuming grantee, whose act or neglect later invalidated the
policy; it being invalidated only as against the mortgagee, the situation of the mortgagor-
surety as well as the grantee is the same as if the policy had originally indemnified the
mortgagee alone; and in that case the same reasoning that was advanced at the beginning
of this sub-topic to support subrogation of the insurer against the owner would support sub-
rogation against his surety. Savings Bank of Ansonia v. Schancupp, 108 Conn. 588, 144
Ati. 36 (1928) (stipulation for subrogation present but not stressed by the court).
153. Allen v. Watertown Fire Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 480 (1882) (paying insurer held to be
subrogated as against the mortgagor and a second mortgagee on the ground that the policy
stipulated for an assignment to the insurer under such circumstances if he should elect to
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gagor, grantee or junior incumbrancer who pays the mortgage debt will
not be subrogated to the insurance,15 4 and even though he procures an
assignment thereof from the mortgagee will be denied recovery thereon
because of circuity of action' 55
Subrogation will not be granted to the insurer as against a second
mortgagee, however, if the policy provides that the insurance shall not
be invalidated as to his interest (as well as that of the first mortgagee)
by the act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner. Thus, let it be supposed
that R makes to E a note and a mortgage for $5,000 and later conveys
the mortgaged property to G, who assumes payment of the first mort-
gage debt and gives a second mortgage to R for $5,000; that G procures
from the I fire insurance company a policy for $5,000, the policy provid-
ing that the loss shall be payable first to E and secondly to R, as their re-
spective interests may appear, and that the insurance shall be invalidated
in certain events as to G but not as to either mortgagee; that such an
event happens; that the building burns with loss of $5,000 leaving land
now worth $5,000; and that I pays $5,000 to E. The insurer, I, will not be
subrogated to Es note against R, and will be subrogated to Ws mortgage
on the land of G only in subordination to the mortgage of R;co other-
wise, the loss would be finally cast on R, when it should rather be borne
by I, since the policy in effect provides that both E and R should be in
the same position as if the insurer had originally engaged solely for their
successive indemnification; in other words, instead of I being surety for
R and subrogated as such, R is surety for I, and as between them the
pay the mortgage debt); Canton Co-operative Bank v. American Central Ins. Co., 219 Mas.
132, 106 N. E. 635 (1914) (insurer held to be discharged by mortgagee's foreclosing the mort-
gage within the reasonable time allowed to the insurer to make an election) ; Eddy v. London
Assurance Corp., 143 N. Y. 311, 38 N. E. 307, 25 L. R. A. 686 (1894); Gillespie v. ScottLh
Union Ins. Co., 61 W. Va. 169, 177, 56 S. E. 213, 216 (1906) ; L. R. A. 1916A 559, 562; Note
(1928) 52 A. L. R. 278. The forms of standard fire policies now required in Mfas-_achusetts
and New York contain a provision for subrogation of the insurer in such a situation. Uss.
GE-N. LAws (1932) c. 175, § 99. RicEAnns Ox INSURANcE, 934, 936.
Moreover, if the agreement for the continuance of the mortgagee's protection and the
stipulation of the insurer for subrogation are separate from the policy, it is dear that on
forfeiture the insurer becomes surety for the mortgagor. While it is true that subrogation is
essentially a matter which concerns the insurer and mortgagor, and hence an effective con-
tract for subrogation must be between those two persons, still the stipulation manifests the
will of the insurer to be a surety and, there being no inconsistent expression of intention on
the part of the mortgagor, equity relates them accordingly and gives the appropriate right
of subrogation. Hare v. Headley, 54 N. J. Eq. 545, 35 At. 445 (1896) (subrogation granted
to insurer as against second mortgagee); Ulster County Saving Institute v. Leake, 73 N. Y.
161 (1878).
154. Walker v. Queen Ins. Co, 136 S. C. 144, 134 S. E. 263, 52 A. L. R. 258, 284 (1926).
155. Lett v. Guardian Fire Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 82, 25 N. E. 1088 (1890).




insurance money paid to E discharged the first mortgage and the note
secured thereby. 57
Nor will the insurer be subrogated as against the mortgagor or owner
if the event is not within the class of those working a forfeiture of their
protection, 58 or if conduct of the insurer relied on by the mortgagor or
owner is such as to bar the former from asserting the forfeiture. 15
CONCLUSION
In most of the situations discussed in this article, certain common
factors are present: two persons are under obligation or other risk to a
third person, who, however, is entitled either legally or equitably to but
one performance. To deprive this third person of the power of fixing the
ultimate incidence of loss by accidental, capricious or collusive action, the
law must fix some relation between the two persons under risk with appro-
priate rights of recourse of one against the other. Whether they shall
be coprincipals or ivhether a certain one shall be surety for the other de-
pends on one or more of many diverse factors, including agreement, com-
mand, fault, normal fault, control, the operation of a dangerous instru-
mentality or the creation of a dangerous situation, difficulty of proof,
form of undertaking or other manifestation of understanding, variation
of risk, and a proper imposition of the cost of insurance.
157. It will be observed that because of the agreement of assumption R was surety in
respect to the first mortgage note and so inchoately subrogated to the first mortgage; con-
sequently, he had two insurable interests in the land, both of which were protected by the
policy, namely, his equity of subrogation in the first mortgage lien and his second mortgage
lien.
158. Fire Assn. v. Patton, 15 N. M. 304, 107 Pac. 679, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 421 (1910).
159. Scottish Union Ins. Co. v. Colvard, 135 Ga. 188, 68 S. E. 1097 (1910).
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